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In 2012, for the first time in fifteen years in Japan, Prime Minister Yoshihiko 
Noda won the parliamentary approval to raise the country’s sales tax by 10 
percent by 2015. Despite the widespread tensions, Noda had stated that he 
would stake his political life on the success of the policy. Noda’s decision to 
raise the consumption tax breached the party’s own manifesto and eventually 
caused the Ozawa-led forty-nine member faction to leave the DPJ in protest. In 
the end, the DPJ underwent a catastrophic defeat in the December 2012 election, 
ending its three years and three months in power. With all the disastrous results 
faced by Noda, why did he raise the consumption tax at the cost of his own 
political life? What was the underlying force that drove Noda to raise the tax 
and act out against his own political interests?  
 
This study examines the influence of bureaucrats on Noda and their own 
capability, rationality, and strategies of approach and persuasion that pushed the 
consumption tax hike behind the scenes. The second chapter, as a background, 
includes literature reviews on the revolution of Japanese bureaucracy in the 




centered government” under LDP and finally to “politician-led government” 
under DPJ. In order to analyze the power of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), 
chapter three observes the internal factors such as the decision making 
processes in Noda’s Administration and Cabinet lineup. This chapter further 
analyzes the external situation such as the Triple Disaster that struck Japan in 
2011 and how MOF skillfully used this to persuade the public by controlling 
the media. 
 
This thesis further examines how bureaucrats have actually obtained more 
influence in policy-making processes under the DPJ and Noda despite DPJ’s 
initial manifesto. Thus, chapter four analyzes various elements of the DPJ that 
bolstered the MOF’s strategic approach and the revival of bureaucratic 
superiority within the policy-making process. In turn, this thesis argues that the 
consumption tax increase in 2012, the long-pursued goal of MOF, was possible 
precisely because it was under DPJ. In other words, starting from the changes in 
the incumbent party, the lack of expertise and knowledge, the confusion and 
instability of DPJ’s setting, its crisis in crisis management enabled bureaucrats 
to finally achieve their long sought after goal of a consumption tax increase. 
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This thesis explores the underlying force of Prime Minister Yoshihiko 
Noda’s 2012 decision to double the sales tax by 2015. For the first time in 
fifteen years in Japan, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda won parliamentary 
approval to raise the country’s sales tax by 10 percent by 2015. Noda argued for 
the importance of raising the consumption tax for snowballing expenditure 
debts and soaring welfare costs, stating, “[It] is important to take the 
opportunity to start to improve the fiscal situation….I want the people to 
understand” (Reynolds and Hirokawa 2012a). His victory, however, caused the 
Ozawa-led-forty-nine member faction to leave the DPJ in protest and he 
eventually lost the next election. Despite the widespread tensions, Noda had 
stated that he would stake his political life on the success of the policy. With all 
the disastrous results that Noda faced, why did Noda raise the consumption tax 
and risk his own political life? What was the underlying force that drove Noda 
to raise the tax and act out against the political interests? This thesis examines 
the influence of MOF’s bureaucrats on Noda and their own capability, 
rationality, and strategies of approach and persuasion that led to the 
consumption tax hike case in 2011. This study further examines how 
bureaucrats have actually achieved more influence in policy-making processes 
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under the DPJ and Noda, despite the DPJ’s initial manifesto, as their long 
dream had come true under the short period of DPJ’s rule - the increase in the 
consumption tax rate.  
 
The second chapter, as a background, includes literature reviews on the 
revolution of Japanese bureaucracy in the sequences of “the administrative 
centered government” to “an executive centered government” under LDP and 
finally to “politician-led government” under DPJ. The first part of the chapter 
explores classical studies in order to examine bureaucratic dominance and 
examines how Japanese society was managed under this administrative 
guidance.  The latter part of the chapter explores how the power of bureaucracy 
has shifted and was regulated under LDP, the power relations between 
politicians and bureaucrats and finally introduces the DPJ’s election manifesto 
regarding the bureaucracy.  
 
 Chapter three applies Junko Kato’s theoretical framework on the case 
of Noda’s consumption tax increase to examine Noda’s decision. This chapter 
focuses on the influence of bureaucrats on Noda and their own capability, 
rationality and strategies of persuasion. This chapter argues beyond Kato’s 
theoretical framework that bureaucrats not only strategically target politicians in 
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order to promote bureaucratic influence on policy-making but also how MOF 
bureaucrats select and educate young politicians and bureaucrats and plant them 
into the Cabinet in order to promote bureaucratic influence on policy-making 
and finally to achieve their goals. In order to prove the power of MOF, chapter 
three analyzes the internal factors such as decision making process in Noda’s 
Administration and the Cabinet lineup with regards to the relationship with 
MOF. This chapter further analyzes the external situation such as the Triple 
Disaster that struck Japan in 2011 and how MOF skillfully used this to persuade 
the public by controlling media. This chapter argues that the consumption tax 
hike in 2012 was possible in combination of MOF controlling both internal 
factor and using external situation.  
 
Chapter four challenges a pre-existing argument that one party’s 
dominance, under LDP, provided a stronger foundation for Japanese 
bureaucratic power and analyzes how bureaucrats have actually achieved more 
influence on policy-making processes under DPJ, regardless of DPJ’s initial 
manifesto. In this chapter, various elements of DPJ that bolster the MOF’s 
strategic approach and the revival of bureaucratic superiority are examined. In 
turn, this study further assures that, as it was in the case of DPJ, bureaucratic 
expertise is in more demand when in a “setting” where there is confusion and 
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instability in the system. In short, this study argues that bureaucrats’ strategic 
persuasion played a controlling role in influencing Noda’s decision and the 
changes in the incumbent party were a crucial factor that enabled it.  
 
Numerous studies have been done to examine the rise and fall of DPJ 
and in attempt to understand Noda’s rationale from a concrete economic 
perspective. Despite various assumptions and hypotheses, there has been 
limited information and evaluation on the underlying forces that impacted 
Prime Minister Noda’s decision-making process and to act against the 
rationality of usual politicians. This thesis attempts to provide another possible 
explanation in understanding the process of sales tax increase in 2012 and how 




 As the aim of this thesis is to explore the actual impact of bureaucrats, 
particularly the Ministry of Finance on Noda’s decision with the sales tax 
increase, a qualitative research methodology is employed. To obtain in-depth 
knowledge and to understand the actual setting of the decision-making process, 
the study has analyzed massive amounts of news articles in a sequential time 
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period from 2009 to 2012, investigated through various sources. This study 
provides descriptive and analytical explanations of the event by presenting 
specific speeches and interviews from associates including former politicians 
and former bureaucrats from various sources. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Despite the two mainstream traditional debates on the “dominant 
bureaucracy school” versus “dominant politician school”, this study focuses on 
the interaction of politicians and bureaucracy on the policy-making process. 
Even this thesis does not argue for the traditional kind of model such as the 
strong “bureaucratic dominant” school, the framework lies on the “bureaucratic 
superiority” on the policy-making process based on the analysis of the 
consumption tax hike case in 2012. It aims to show how Noda and DPJ boosted 
the revival of “bureaucratic superiority” based on the tax issue.  
 
In order to investigate bureaucratic influence on politicians and their 
strategic persuasion within Noda’s case, this study references Junko Kato’s 
theoretical framework from “Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality,” which 
addresses some fundamental issues on the bureaucratic influence on past 
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policy-making and politicians vis-à-vis the tax reform. Kato rejects 
conventional explanations that assume an overwhelming advantage for 
bureaucrats as policy specialists which involve “the monopolization of policy 
information and expertise enables them to manipulate the political process and 
to override the popular will by tricking party politicians who are supposed to 
represent it” (1994). Kato argues that they strategically target politicians in 
order to control the information carefully as the “sharing policy information and 
knowledge with incumbent politicians is compatible with the promotion of 
bureaucratic influence in policy-making” (1994, 38). 
 
Furthermore, Kato characterizes bureaucratic rationality as “bounded, 
in nature, since bureaucrats pursue the goal or a hierarchy of goals defined by 
their utility function and use means that are most appropriate to achieve them” 
(Kato 1994). To explain how bureaucrats strategically impact the policy-
making process and pursue its objectives, she uses bounded rationality of 
organizations—in her case, technocratic bureaucracy— in terms of the 
relationship with other organizations. She argues that bureaucratic organizations, 
if they are organized to promote members’ pursuance of organizational goals, 
are likely, in the long run, to gain influence over political organizations. I 
further discuss Kato’s key arguments in her framework in this chapter as I 
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attempt apply onto Noda.  This study comparatively analyzes the past VAT led 
by LDP and doubled sales tax led by DPJ (primarily Noda) in 2012, referencing 
Kato’s theoretical framework which details the respective power of bureaucracy 
and political parties in Japanese policy-making.     
 
Furthermore, beyond Kato’s theoretical framework, this study further 
sets its theoretical framework that bureaucrats not only strategically target 
reliable sponsors ---existing politicians--- for pursuing their policy goals, but 
they also strategically educate young politicians and bureaucrats in advance and 
plant them into the Cabinet at the appropriate time in order to promote 
bureaucratic influence on policy-making and to finally achieve their goals. This 
study calls the installation of its allies “plantation” which itself serves as 
foundation and evidence of the “bureaucratic superiority” on the Japanese 







Chapter 2: Literature Review: ‘The administrative centered government’ 
to ‘an executive centered government’ to ‘politician-led government’ 
 
For the past several decades, the long-running debate on Japanese 
politics centered on the question of “who governs Japan?” (Wright 1999, 
Johnson 1996) and “who exercises primary influence in policymaking?” 
(Mulgan 2000). The two dominant school on the Japanese policy-making 
process has been divided into two schools, the “dominant bureaucracy school” 
(Kanryo-shudo Ron) and the “dominant politicians school” (Seijika-yui ron). 
Despite the two traditional mainstream arguments, recent political science 
focuses on the relationship and interaction between of bureaucrats and 
politician in the policy-making process, “in practice the ministries and the LDP 
negotiate closely with each other, leaving political scientists to debate endlessly 
over which one really dominates the policy process” (Vogel 2006, 41).  
 
In order to gain background on the power of bureaucracy and how it 
has shifted over time, this chapter explores the transformation of Japanese 
bureaucracy in the sequence of “the administrative centered government” to “an 
executive centered government” —under LDP— to “politician-led 
government”—under DPJ— based on literature review. The first section 
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provides a background on how Japanese society was sustained under 
bureaucratic dominance by referencing the “bureaucracy dominant” model. The 
next section of the chapter presents how and why the capabilities of 
bureaucracy shifted under LDP and how the relationship between bureaucrats 
and politicians changed over time. The last section of chapter ends with 
bureaucracy under DPJ rule while mainly focusing on DPJ’s primary election 
manifesto under Prime Minister Hatoyama, which involves in “breaking the 
domination of the bureaucracy”(Asahi Shimbun 10
th
 August 2009).  
 
This chapter serves as a crucial background for chapter three, which 
explores the revival of bureaucratic influence on the decision-making process in 
the case of Noda, then into chapter four which argues that DPJ was actually 
incapable of challenging the bureaucracy; in fact, bureaucrats re-gained 
bureaucratic superiority as their long dream had come true under the short 
period of DPJ’s rule - the increase in the consumption tax rate. 
 
1. The administrative centered government: bureaucratic dominance, 




This section explores Japan under bureaucratic dominance and how 
Japanese society was managed under this administrative guidance. According to 
Makihara Izuru, a professor at Tōhoku University, during the era of LDP rule, 
there was a tendency to pin the blame on the bureaucracy whenever results got 
unpleasant (2011).  The ultimate responsibility sits with the politicians in 
power, however, the attempts to shift blame onto the bureaucracy revealed that 
the LDP was essentially under a bureaucracy driven government (Izuru 2011). 
Moreover, Shigeaki Koga, an industry ministry official, stated that, “if we 
compare Japan to a bus company, politicians are managers and bureaucrats are 
drivers” and “under the LDP government, everything was left to the drivers” 
(Asahi Shimbun 15th August 2011). The conventional perspective is that as 
bureaucrats are the policy specialists, the overwhelming advantages are given 
allowing them to monopolize the policy information and manipulate the 
political process. Based on the literature review, this section explores one of the 
first and the most mainstream argument, the “dominant bureaucracy school”.. 
 
Sheldon Garon, in his “Molding Japanese Mind: The state in everyday 
life”, challenges the existing dominant interpretation of the pre-war Japanese 
state of “emperor-system thesis” argues that Japanese society can be depicted as 
an “enigma” since their civil liberties coexist within such a highly managed 
 
11 
society under the bureaucrats’ influence (1998, 235). Under the examination of 
the state management on trans-war development through welfare, sexuality and 
gender relations and religion movement, Garon maintains his argument that 
Japanese society is far more extensively controlled by the state than other 
Western democratic societies since the state was always interested in “social 
management” in order to preserve order and facilitate its social development. 
For example, as early as the 1880s, Japanese intellectual, local elites and 
officials gathered to awaken a sense of nation to Japanese civilians to 
modernize and compete with other Western countries (1998, 9). As the 
twentieth century began, a new generation of elite bureaucrats noticed the 
importance of the “unity of the people’s spirit” and persuaded the state that they 
needed to focus on mobilizing and managing human resources.  
 
Traditionally, the administrative culture evolved as dominant culture 
covering the entire society (Ide 1982). Despite the origin of strong bureaucracy 
in Japan is debatable among scholars, Furukawa explains that it goes far back to 
the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) based on the idea of samurai and the Chinese 
ideology of state governance (1999). Masaru Sakamoto argues that the initial 
advancement of public administration in Japan is generally traced back to the 
early Meiji era (2001, 251). In addition, the bureaucrats were considered to be 
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the servants of the emperor in the prewar period and personnel administration 
was based on a spiritual and emotional administration upon a send of loyalty 
and honor (Adachi 1962). Moreover, according to Sakamoto, the amendment of 
the ordinance in 1932 led to the decline of party control over the appointment of 
the bureaucrats and thereby the power and security of the bureaucrats advanced.  
 
A leading advocate of the “bureaucratic dominance school” Tsuji 
Kiyoaki, in “A study of Japanese Bureaucracy,” argues that, “the causes of the 
bureaucratic supremacy lie in the Japanese historical development directly 
shifted from monarchy to the contemporary administrative state, skipping the 
stage of civil society” (1952). Tsuji introduces the three factors that boosted 
bureaucratic power. First, the bureaucrats’ power was enhanced after the defeat 
in World War II, which led to the dismantling of the occupation authorities, and 
gunbatsu to zaibatsu who had exercised power in the past. Second, the image or 
fantasy over bureaucratic neutrality and lastly, the weak power of politician 
forces and politicians all contribute to the increase in the bureaucratic power. 





The first in-depth systematic study of the administrative elite is written 
by Charmers Johnson, “MITI and the Japanese Miracle” in 1982. This work is 
profound since the “emperor’s servant” type of bureaucratic image in the past 
has transformed into a “sophisticated technocrat” (Yamaguchi 1987). Johnson 
argued that “the most talented graduates of best university….the elite 
bureaucracy of Japan makes most major decisions” and assures that this 
economic bureaucracy is a natural corollary of plan rationality (1982, 20). 
Johnson describes bureaucrats as the source of major policy innovation in the 
system and as the control of the national budget their primary purpose was to 
industrialize and strengthen the nation’s international competitive in both pre- 
and post-war Japan. “The elite bureaucracy of Japan makes most decisions, 
drafts virtually all legislation, controls the national budget, and is the source of 
all major policy innovation in the system” (Johnson 1982, 320).  
 
He emphasizes the role of bureaucrats’ capability as their power of 
financial control and their strategy of export-led growth with its own industrial 
policy. Moreover, he places great importance on Minister of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), the pilot agency that played a central role leading and 
guiding postwar economic development in Japan. Along with acknowledging 
the significance of bureaucrats in their role of policy making, he argues that the 
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bureaucrats were the central agencies who facilitated and spearheaded the 
country’s economic growth (1982). Moreover, in the beginning in 1951, 
“Deliberation council” controlled by the MOF supervised and approved annual 
revisions became a permanent organ of the prime minister’s office renamed as 
the Tax System Deliberation Council (Zeisei Chosa Kai). Johnson describes 
that it worked as an annual revisions in the tax system in the light of changing 
needs and economic situation and, “after the creation of LDP the council 
became the MOF’s main tool for attempting to prevent the party for politicizing 
the tax system” (1982, 234).  Moreover, establishing a broad based 
consumption tax was closely related to the MOF’s organizational interest of 
increasing, or at least maintaining, control over the budget. The entire ministry 
made a deep commitment to the new tax, the MOF consistently put the highest 
priority on the introduction of a broad-based consumption tax (Kato 1994, 12).  
 
 Moreover, according Byung Chul Koh, there are three other factors that 
indicate the model of bureaucratic dominance: first, the existence of former 
bureaucrats in the LDP, second the quasi-legislative powers of bureaucracy, and 
the last, de facto bureaucratic control over advisory commissions. About 25 
percent of LDP Diet members were former bureaucrats and this, “entry of so 
many former bureaucrats into the diet implies that its perceived power is great” 
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and “it can be treated as a sign not of bureaucratic ascendancy but of the Diet’s 
dominance” (Koh 1989).  
 
Whereas Johnson, Koh and Tusji find the power of bureaucracy 
based on the power it has over the process of policy-making, other scholars 
claims that bureaucratic power is maintained not because they are so strong, but 
because of Japan’s political leadership deficit (Mulgan 2000), fragmented 
government with weak prime ministers (Campbell 1989) and a lack of political 
authority (Furukawa 1999). A.G. Mulgan argues that “In Japan, the bureaucrats 
regard themselves as an independent source of political authority” (2000). 
Traditionally Japanese prime ministers “ended up playing a passive role in 
Cabinet meetings” since the objective of the meeting itself was to confirm what 
has already been approved by the administrative vice-ministers at their meeting 
the day before” (2000, 188). Yawata Kazuo further claims that this kind of 
meeting takes away the “political role that the cabinet is supposed to play” 
(1998, 3). Furthermore, John Creighton Campbell’s concept of “bureaucratic 
primacy” argues that, “bureaucrats are still the main force for change in most 
policy communities in Japan” (1989). Moreover, one of factor that results in 
Japan’s chronic leadership failure is on the entrenched bureaucratic prerogative. 
Mulgan further argues that “What is so insidious about the exercise of this kind 
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of bureaucratic power is that it is power without responsibility” as the 
responsibility in Japanese system is formally based on the Cabinet (Article 66 
of the constitution).  
 
 Furthermore, the bureaucracy’s supremacy is also explained based on 
the LDP’s lack of ability to control the party itself. The party’s mechanisms for 
integrating and coordinating policy did not function well (Sato and Matsuzaki 
1986). Moreover, Curtis argues that, “the LDP has been more a ‘catch-all’ than 
a ‘programmatic’ party, without a well-defined policy line” (1988). Back in 
1997 when Kan was leader of the main opposition Democratic Party; have 
stated that, “nothing comes before the Cabinet for a decision unless it is passed 
by the vice-ministers” (Mulgan 2000).  Furthermore, ministers have hard time 
imposing their policy will on bureaucrats who run their own agendas and evade 
or even rejects their minister’s instruction. 
 
Curtis in his “The Japanese way of Politics” argues that bureaucrats are 
far more than just “agents” of political leaders and they have their own political 
power. With the controlling important information and policy expertise, 
“bureaucracy has served in effect as the LDP’s think tank” (1988, 60). 
Notwithstanding, some of LDP Diet members have extensive knowledge about 
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particular policy areas, individual politicians and LDP did not have its own staff 
of policy experts and politicians can be considered as  “generalists who need 
the support of specialist in order to formulate policy” (Curtis 1988). Moreover, 
bureaucrats, “employed quiet persuasion, using their expertise and the close 
personal relationship they had developed with longs-serving political leader to 
convince the LDP to adopt particular policies” (Curtis 1988, 63). Kato also 
argues that the bureaucratic organizations, if they are organized to promote 
members’ pursuance of organizational goals with their specialized expertise are 
in the long run, gain influence over political organizations.  
 
2. Fall of Bureaucratic Power: moving towards ‘an executive 
centered government’ under LDP  
 
In the continuation of the last section which examined the capabilities 
of the bureaucracy in Japan, this section further explores how and why it has 
shifted over time in the respect to the power of politicians. The purpose of this 
section is not to focus on the other stream of argument, the “dominant-politician” 
or “dominant-party” school which argues that politicians have more power in 
the policy-making process than bureaucrats as they developed expert 
knowledge about policies of their own. Rather, the aim of this section is to 
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analyze how bureaucratic power has weakened by observing the background 
behind for “administrative reforms” in post-war era and the emergence of idea 
on “an executive centered government”. 
 
 Johnson states that there was no doubt that the official state 
bureaucracy governed Japan until about 1975. Notwithstanding, along with the 
liberalization of the Japanese economy in the 1960s, Johnson himself admitted 
and wrote about the decline of MITI’s power and impact. “During the 1970s a 
subtle combination of events started apparent decline in the power of the 
bureaucracy and a concurrent rise in the power of the LDP” (Johnson 1986). 
With the abolishment on the control of licensing, allocation and foreign 
currency the “golden era” was over. Johnson admits that from 1970s, the LDP 
had started to play a more prominent and influential role in policy making. TJ 
Pemple in the “Unbundling Japan Inc” also concluded that “a relative decrease 
in the hegemonic powers of bureaucratic agencies, and a rise in the influence of 
the LDP and its parliamentary members” (1987). 
 
 Furthermore, in the 1980s, based on the pluralism approach, the 
emphasis had shifted toward LDP politicians whom were in competition with 
other individual politicians within the party itself for the votes in the election. 
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With the Zoku Giin (political tribes) in the LDP which has gained expert 
knowledge and important information on the specific policies and social need, 
has matured to intervene in the policy-making process that were dominated by 
the bureaucracy in the past (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987). Sato and Matsuzaki 
further argues that Japanese politics as pluralism which is managed by both the 
bureaucracy and LDP and explains how the LDP politicians gradually enhance 
their leadership over the bureaucrats in terms of the policy making process 
(1986). Muramatsu argues that bureaucratic dominance has divorced from the 
reality and significant increase in the power of politicians, “the LDP made the 
final decision on political competition between groups and the bureaucracy or 
between agency-group collations…. Ministerial bureaucrats propose and LDP 
decides” (Muramatsu and Krauss 1987, 60). Moreover, in the application of 
“rational choice” theory to Japanese politics, Ramseyer and Rosembluth argues 
that politicians have taken control over bureaucracy which means that the LDP 
have completely control over the initiative in the policy-making process. By 
using the principal-agent theory, they argue against the “dominant bureaucracy 
school” and they contends that it should rather be interpreted as the politicians 




Moreover, amid the corruption scandals and an economic slump, the 
bureaucratic body that dominated the nation’s postwar boom before the 1990s 
was stripped of its powers. Gerald Curtis argues that, “the traditional image of 
the Japanese bureaucracy as incorruptible, competent, and trustworthy has 
suffered irreparable damage as a result of policy failures and scandals that have 
hit one ministry after another since the early 1990s” (2002). He further assures 
that the bureaucratic power was also challenged by changing public attitudes 
about transparency and accountability. Steven Vogel, in his Japan remodeled, 
argues that the key features of Japan’s distinctive economic model has been 
questioned, including a powerful guiding bureaucracy as he says MOF [may 
have contributed to the bubble and “to make matters worse, they misjudged the 
economic situation, assuming that an imminent recovery would boost the stock 
market and strengthen the financial institutions” (Vogel 2006). Therefore, much 
of the blame is on Japan’s elite bureaucrats for the prolonged economic crisis, 
since these bureaucrats were too powerful and too inclined to meddle in the 
markets. Vogel further argues that to know the underlying reason why the 
Japanese government made critical errors in fiscal policy, monetary policy, and 
banking regulation, “we must begin with the bureaucrats who oversee these 




Jennifer Amyx observes the bureaucrats’ limitation to explain why the 
Japanese government took so long to respond effectively to the banking crisis. 
Amyx concludes by the 1990s, the ministry-centered networks became 
dysfunctional despite its good performance during much of the postwar era. She 
contends that increased financial regulation and the networks’ instability due to 
party realignment and the coalition government in the 1990s were the main 
point that the MOF’s traditional approach of informal relations-based regulation 
became outmoded, and as result, the ministry focused on defending themselves 
from political attack than managing the banking crisis (Amyx 2004). Vogel 
proposes a simpler explanation that the “MOF officials were committed to a 
particular model of banking regulation that had served them well in the past so 
they were naturally slow to change their ways in the face of new changes” 
(2006, 49). Moreover, the insulation from political pressure led MOF to act 
slowly to the crisis until it grew out of the their hand, “when they discovered 
that bank was in trouble they would downplay or even hide the problem for fear 
that public disclosure might lead to a run on bank” (Vogel 2006, 49).  
 
Moreover, the criticism grew towards the administrative centered 
government in the 1990s due to their careless efforts in enhancing the general 
welfare and the “haven” provided to the minor group of bureaucrats (Nakamura 
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2012). With the growing demand that elective members of politician take a 
leading role in country and to move away from the “administrative centered 
government”, several attempts were made to achieve “an executive centered 
government” carried out by former LDP leaders including Hashimoto Ryutaro 
(January 1996-July 1998) and Koizumi Junichiro (April 2001- September 2006). 
For example, efforts were made in order to reduce the bureaucratic power and 
to strengthen prime Minister’s Office, the Kantei. Hashimoto proposed in the 
1997 to cut the number of division in the bureaus of ministries and agencies in 
order to streamline the administrative organizations and create a new Economic 
Policy council to strengthen the Prime Minister’s power to draw up the national 
budget (Mulgan 2000). However, though the Kantei has increased its power but 
has not established its control over policymaking (Curtis 2002). Moreover, 
Peter Drucker in his, “In Defense of Bureaucracy” states that despite recent 
scandals, the bureaucracy still is the only elite member in the Japanese society 
(1998). 
 
After evaluating the MOF itself and its ideological commitment to 
fiscal balance, Vogel turns to the interaction between the ministry and party 
politicians to explain the fiscal policy’s failure to respond to the bubble burst 
with the appropriate fiscal stimulus. Throughout the postwar era, MOF officials 
 
23 
have hold a strong preference for balanced budgets and could achieve this goal 
until 1970s when they faced challenges. It has been debated by political 
scientists who argue that the 1970s were a turning point in Japanese politics. 
The relationship between the MOF and the LDP, however, was not a zero-sum 
game. Instead, the two managed to achieve cooperation during the 1980s. Vogel 
argues that, “in practice the ministries and the LDP negotiate closely with each 
other, leaving political scientists to debate endlessly over which one really 
dominates the policy process” (2006, 41). Curtis also argues that “the 
relationship between bureaucrats and politician during the long period of LDP 
one-party dominance cannot be explain in terms of a zero-sum game in which 
the bureaucrats had all the power and the politicians had non” (2000).  
 
Kato further emphasizes the interaction between bureaucrats and 
politicians based on the cooperation by sharing common expertise (1994). As in 
the all advanced nations, a convergence of politician and bureaucrats in policy 
making is emerging (Muramatsu and Krauss 1984). Shun’ichi Furukawa, in his 
“Political Authority and Bureaucratic Resilience,” further argues that this 
interaction between bureaucrats and politicians, which has been characterized 
by cooperation among those sharing common expertise, are in fact the main 
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factors that lead to the weaker political authority over bureaucracy and the 
source of constraint of administrative reform in Japan (1999). 
 
This section, as a background, evaluated how the bureaucrat’s 
capability shifted over time and their influence on policies and politicians. One 
essential point we must acknowledge is that bureaucrats had the capabilities to 
lead the growth of the state and because they were so strong, they were the 
main source of the blame. However, as Johnson argues, gradually from the 
1960s there was decline in the power of the bureaucracy and as Vogel contends, 
it must be recognized that strong bureaucratic influence that dominated the 
nation’s post-war boom before the 1990s has been weakened along with several 
scandals and economic slumps. Kato further explains this shift as, “in Japan, 
where bureaucracy played a major role in modernization and authoritarian rule, 
the convergence of the roles of politicians and bureaucrats comes from the 
increasing power of politicians during the democratization process” (Kato 1994, 
13).  
 
Despite the two mainstream traditional debates on the “dominant 
bureaucracy school” versus “dominant politician school”, this study focuses on 
the interaction of politicians and the bureaucracy on the policy-making process. 
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Despite the fact that this study does not take the position for either the 
“bureaucratic dominant” or the “dominant politicians’ school”, the framework 
lies on the “bureaucratic superiority” on the policy-making process based on the 
analysis of the consumption tax hike case in 2012. Based on the framework, it 
aims to show how Noda and DPJ have made the revival of “bureaucratic 
superiority” on the policy-making process possible. 
 
3. DPJ’s Election Manifesto: towards ‘politician-led government’ 
under DPJ, declaration of war on bureaucracy 
 
The victory of DPJ in 2009 was a remarkable political event as Japanese 
politics were under the LDP rule in almost all the years since the end of World 
War II. The Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was elected on September 16th 
2009 with a high level of popularity and with great expectations for the DPJ 
administration. As he was the first prime minister of DPJ “with no model to go 
by, he has only a blank canvas to work with” (Asahi Shimbun 22
nd
 September 
2009). The primary goal of the new administration was to establish a strong 
foundation to perform political leadership on policy-making within the 
government ministries and the “proposed Administrative Reform Council is to 





September 2009). Hatoyama introduced a series of institutional changes in 
order to abolish the existing bureaucracy controlled government and to establish 
a “politician led government” and “a true people centered government” 
(Shinoda 2013, 799). The politician-led policy-making meant fixing two major 
characteristics of the traditional policymaking system, weakening the strength 
of bureaucrats and eliminating the dual structure (Mishima 2015, 436). 
 
Asahi Shimbun on September 2nd 2009 reported that, “the National 
Strategy Bureau that will be created to answer directly to the prime minister 
will hold the key to the successful functioning of this system under which the 
administration takes the initiative and reduces dependence on the bureaucracy.” 
Furthermore, in order to dismiss the traditional "bottom-up" budget compilation 
process, which was under Finance Ministry bureaucrats’ charge, the top-down 
approach will be used to decide the priority of policies. “This bureau is pivotal 
to the new administration's decision-making setup with the prime minister at the 
top of the pyramid” (Asahi Shimbun 2
nd
 September 2009). 
 
Furthermore, the new administration formed “Three Political 
Appointees’ Conference” (Seimu Sanyaku Kaigi) in each ministry as a top 
policy-making body.  In order to “plan and coordinate policies from a people’s 
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point of view,” policy decisions were made by the minister, deputy minister, 
and parliamentary secretaries (Shinoda 2013, 800). “The DPJ wanted to get its 
political executives to act as the ‘master’ in their ministry and command 
organizational processes” (Mishima 2015, 437). Furthermore, to take away 
budget authority from MOF, the Government Revitalization Unit (Gyosei 
Sasshin Kaigi) was established directly beneath the prime minister. DPJ 
expected a scenario of politician –led budget formulating where they can use 
revenues for social security and promote economic growth by cutting wasteful 
spending rather than under bureaucratic control (Tanaka 2014). 
 
Over the first 12 days as prime minister, in comparison to the previous 
LDP government, Hatayama met 26 Cabinet ministers and only eight 
bureaucrats. Where Taro Aso met with 21 ministers and 24 bureaucrats, while 
Yasuo Fukuda met with 16 ministers and 27 bureaucrats and Shinzo Abe met 
with 21 ministers and 19 bureaucrats over the first 12 days of their respective 
administrations (Asahi Shimbun 7th October 2009).  
 
Hatoyama quickly abandoned the administrative vice-ministerial 
meeting which was a symbol of the bureaucracy’s supremacy. In fear of 
bureaucratic manipulation, political executives kept detailed technical matters 
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to themselves, shared minimal information to bureaucrats and did not allow 
bureaucrats to attend to the Conference of Three Political Executives in many 
ministries (Mishima 2015, 438). In brief, “the people's elected representatives 
will make decisions first and then tell bureaucrats what to do” (Asahi Shimbun 
2nd September 2009). Asahi Shimbun on October 7th, 2009 reported that, 
“bureaucratic memos have no place in the new administration led by Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama's Democratic Party of Japan” since the Cabinet 
members made decision to not look at it. Bureaucrats were allow to offer their 
input on relevant data, but were no longer allow to offer memos instructing 
them on what to say. 
 
In short, with reference to the Britain model, to move away from 
traditional LDP decision making process and to establish political leadership, 
Hatoyama as DPJ leader, introduced several institutional arrangements to 
reduce bureaucratic power. The following chapter 3 explores the revival of 







Chapter 3: Application of Theoretical Framework on Noda Government 
 
Various assumptions were made to explain why Prime Minister Noda 
was so eager to push the consumption tax increase. Among many scholars, the 
major rationale considered to be based on the concrete economic perspective, a 
possible fiscal crisis along with the rapidly aging Japan. To explain the 
underlying rationale behind Noda’s sacrificial decision, in a concrete economic 
perspective, some believe that Prime Minister Noda did what he had to do for 
the sake of his nation. Although this study acknowledges the importance of 
consumption tax increase, the issue of neither fiscal expenditure nor the aging 
phenomenon is new to Japanese politicians. “Everyone knew that consumption 
tax increase was necessary, but the reality is that nobody takes the initiative” 
(Park 2015). According to the rational choice perspective, re-election is 
the  primary concern for party politicians in general as it is true that the LDP 
politicians’ concern for re-election is a significant element in explaining policy 
outcomes in general (Kato 1995, 327).  
 
Gerald Curtis in his “The Japanese way of politics” argues, the secret 
of LDP’s long success could be ascribed to a strong determination to win the 
election (1988). When the Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira proposed the VAT 
 
30 
for Japan in 1979, it incurred significant political costs for policymakers, 
resulting in public fury and thus, poor showing of the LDP incumbent in the 
general election of the Lower House of the Diet (Kato 1994). Due to public 
opposition, there have been several years of delays until the LDP finally 
activated the passage of the new tax, which made the LDP crippled over the 
control of the Diet for the first time since. The next attempt under the 
Hosokawa administration in 1994 faced fierce opposition and eventually 
resulted in the collapse of the administration. The consumption tax in Japan 
could be described as a taboo that most prime ministers tried to avoid as “the 
consumption tax has long been the issue that sparks irrational anger and 
discontent in the usually placid Japanese general public” (Duignan 2013). 
 
Despite the fact that consumption tax increase may be inevitable from 
an economic perspective; this thesis analyzes Noda’s choice and outcome from 
a concrete political perspective. Moreover, some argue that DPJ had no choice 
but to raise tax due to the financial burden resulted in their initial promises on 
social welfare. Nevertheless, based on the political perspective, this explanation 
leaves further puzzles since their effort to keep their promise on social welfare 
plans is equally important as their first manifesto to keep the promise to not to 
increase the consumption tax for next four years. In fact, the violation of public 
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pledge to not to increase consumption has more negative influence in terms of 
public condemnation. According to the book, “The Rise and Fall of Democratic 
Party of Japan,” there are three major factors that contributed to the decline of 
the approval rate of DPJ: the consumption tax issue, money and politics, and 
diplomatic issues. Regardless the fact that the consumption tax policy has about 
an equal rate of support and opposition; it has major influence on the cabinet 
approval rate (Park 2014, 145). Thus it is difficult to see Noda was so eager to 
pass consumption tax hike bill due to the overwhelming financial burden 
resulted from DPJ’s initial social welfare pledges.  
 
While acknowledging the fact that there are various elements to explain 
the fall of the DPJ, this thesis focuses on Noda’s decision to raise consumption 
tax in 2012. The consumption tax is a particularly important factor to explain 
the fall of DPJ since it caused the major defection of the party with 66 members 







1. Bureaucrats under Noda Administration and Policy-Making 
Process 
 
The DPJ rose to power by criticizing the close relationship between the 
three points in the iron triangle under LDP. They attempted to end the close ties 
between bureaucrats, businesses, and politics in favour of a system where 
politicians would occupy the main policy-making roles. One of the most 
important manifestos of DPJ was to remove all wasteful spending caused by 
traditional bureaucratic policy making system. Prime Minister Hatoyama 
attempted to establish administrative renovation council to cut unfair element in 
nation’s budget and the administrative system which he described as “a historic 
shift” (Asahi Shimbun 29
th
 July 2009). Just as other DPJ members, Noda used 
to criticize amakudari practices and informal ties between the Japanese politics, 
bureaucracy and business (Zakaowski 2015). Despite these promises and initial 
changes made under the DPJ, there was a reversion back to the old, LDP-model 
of politics by the time Noda took power in 2011. Additionally, the DPJ 
promised to not increase any taxes as well as to curtail bureaucratic power – all 




Therefore, the DPJ government has been accused of “dancing to the 
tune of the Ministry of Finance”, and there has been criticism on Kan and his 
successor Noda that issued calls for fiscal rehabilitation which has long been at 
the top of the MOF’s agenda in 2012 (Izuru 2011). Similarly in the past, Kato 
argues that from the late 1970s and late 1980s MOF continued to be a major 
advocate of reforming the tax system through a major indirect tax on 
consumption and this period is “when LDP began to incline toward the 
introduction of VAT that the MOF proposed” (Kato 1994).  
 
Despite Noda having once stated that, "Japan has no time to waste if it 
is to regain fiscal health. But I am not a fundamentalist devoted to fiscal 
discipline” (Asahi Shimbun 3
rd
 September 2011). At the news conference on 
September 2nd, he speedily moved toward a strong an advocacy of tax increase. 
Hrebenar and Nakamura in their book, “Party Politics in Japan” argues that 
considerable “energy had been wasted on unproductive power games between 
politicians and bureaucrats” until Noda establishes smoother relations with 
bureaucrats which was characterized the operations of the Finance (2015, 103). 




“The competition for leadership between the politicians and the 
bureaucrats has been unproductive. Without making a full use of the 
bureaucratic organization that constitutes a group of experts, it is impossible to 
effectively administer the country. (. . .) It is crucial to establish a reasonable 
institutional management” (Noda 2011). 
 
Figure 1. The Decision-Making Process under Noda Administration
    
 
     (Source: “Decision-Making Reform in Japan” Zakaowski) 
 
Noda tried established a better relationship with the bureaucrats 
(Shinoda 2013, 224). He tried to restore the party’s relations with bureaucrats 
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and relied on their expertise and guidance much more widely. Figure 1 
represents the decision-making process of the Noda administration (Zakaowski 
2015). By institutionalizing activity of the inter-ministerial liaison council, 
Noda was able to sustain more effective relations with bureaucrats which also 
meant that it was on the way back to the traditional bottom-up decision-making 
process. “He tried to mimic the LDP’s traditional policy making system” 
(Mishima 2015, 441). Noda specifically announced that decisions will not be 
made without the consent with the DPJ Policy Research Committee. 
Furthermore, Noda re-established the DPJ Tax System Research Committee, a 
crucial decision-making body, which was abandoned in 2009 under Hatoyama 
government. 
 
 Karol Zakaowski in his “Decision-Making Reform in Japan” laid out 
some specific details of how the relationship between Noda and bureaucrats 
restored. After the invitation of all the administrative vice-ministers to Noda’s 
residence on September 6th 2011---at the request of their cooperation on 
rebuilding after the natural disaster--- “the number of direct contacts between 
the prime minister and civil servants increased considerably” (2015). Just two 
days after becoming the prime minister, Noda exercised LDP-like practice of 
bringing one of his administrative secretaries to accompany him as a “suitcase 
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carrier” (Kuboniwa 2012, 143). Furthermore, the administrative secretaries 
were able to have dinner with the prime minister, which provided them greater 
opportunity to investigate Noda’s intentions (Zakaowski 2015).  
 
Noda arranged the regular Friday meetings of the senior officials as 
permanent. After the September 9th meeting where 17 vice minister-level 
bureaucrats gathered at Noda’s Official Residence for a working lunch, 
Taketoshi said, "it is important to share information and the meetings are useful 
for improving communications” (Asahi Shimbun 10
th
 September 2011). At a 
September 9th news conference, Osamu Fujimura, a Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
further claimed that, "it will become a much wider ranging meeting than in the 
past. It should by no means be considered a revival of the vice ministers 
meetings.”   
 
Contrary to the old Conference of Administrative Vice Ministers, the 
new weekly meeting , “was not given authority to sanction the Cabinet 
meeting’s agenda, but its launching gave the green light to the bureaucracy’s 
full-fledged undertaking of coordination among political actors” (Mishima 2015, 
441). Ko Mishima, in his “The Democratic Party of Japan’s Unsuccessful 
Policymaking System Reform” argues that, “bureaucrats completely regained 
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their traditional strength” (2015).  Bureaucrats once again became the central 
stage of policy making by retrieving traditional responsibility for political 
coordination. Just as under LDP years, they regularly visit parliamentarians’ 
offices for the briefing for political consultation. On January 2012, Noda 
canceled the policy that disallowed the chief of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau 
to answer parliamentary questions. “Noda extensively relied on the MOF 
bureaucrats’ help” (Mishima 2015, 442). 
 
“The fact that he (Noda) committed himself so strongly to the 
consumption tax increase shows the very heavy influence of the Ministry of 
Finance,” said Koichi Nakano, a political science professor at Sophia 
University in Tokyo, “politically it’s remarkable that the MOF managed to 
convince Noda to bring about a collective suicide of the whole party” 
(Reynolds and Hirokawa 2012b). Moreover, Yoichi Takahashi, a former 
finance ministry official has stated that, “the Ministry of Finance is not just on 
its way back to power, it’s already there,” when Noda defied opinion polls and 
allowed the breakup of his own party to push the ministries to double the sales 




 The Asahi newspaper reported that when Noda uses the expression such 
as “revenue reform” instead of “tax hikes,” and when he failed to be specific on 
many issues, “some people may rightfully dismiss his speech as a ‘composition 
written by bureaucrats’ ” (Asahi Shimbun 14
th
 September 2011). Tomohito 
Shinoda, a Professor at the International University, stated that, “many experts 
observed that the prime minister was controlled by the bureaucrats, like many 
past LDP prime ministers” (Shinoda 2013, 227) and that Noda was the 
ministry’s puppet (Yakushiji 2012, 139). 
 
Noda lacked the experience in working as a bureaucrat or as a white a-
collar worker that has managed big organizations (Zakaowski 2015, 161). 
Moreover, Noda has never worked as party secretary-general or policy chief, 
and “his only Cabinet experience is the last 15 months as finance minister” 
(Asahi 31
st
 August 2011). He tried emulate LDP-like practices but, “he lacked 
both the experience and personal connections to maintain the politics of 
harmony in the face of tough political struggle” (Zakaowski 2015). Indeed, 
Noda’s such background made it “even easier for the bureaucrats to regain their 
role in coordinating contradictory interest and seeking inter-ministerial 
consensus within the framework of ‘a reasonable institutional management’ 
announced by the new prime minister” (Zakaowski 2015). Sakakibara Eisuke, a 
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former MOF bureaucrat argues that “this lack of experience in administration or 
the private sector made Noda more prone to pressure from the bureaucrats” 
(Sakaibara 2012). 
 
Despite the fact that Noda did not demand high-ranking bureaucrats, 
such as administrative vice-ministers or bureau chiefs be accompanied by 
politicians when making appointments with him, (Yakushiji 2011) Zakaowski 
claims that, “the ministers who met with Noda were usually accompanied by 
bureaucrats” (2015). Prime Minister’s Aide Suematsu Yoshinori stressed that 
the MOF officials, in particular, significantly increased good access to the prime 
minister. Suematsu further claims that, unlike other ministries, finance ministers 
were accompanied by an administrative vice-minister who acted as an ‘overseer’ 
when they visited Noda and it became like a rule. There was even growing 
concern since Noda was constantly surrounded by the MOF bureaucrats at the 
end of 2011(Zakaowski 2015). 
 
 Kato argues that when bureaucrats choose an objective that they cannot 
attain immediately, over time, they rationally engage a strategy designed to lead 
to policy outcomes as she says, bureaucrats first seek to get “reliable political 
sponsors for their proposed policies among incumbent politicians” (Kato 1994, 
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11). In turn, Noda, like his predecessor Kan, has ditched the party’s no-tax 
promises. Furthermore, Kato argues that incumbent politicians, who have 
gained specialized knowledge and expertise primarily from exposure to and 
interaction with bureaucrats during long careers are more likely to accept if they 
consider the bureaucrats’ proposal as sensible in terms of their specialized 
knowledge and acquired expertise. Thus it is arguable that Noda’s lack of 
experience in administration and the private sector management made Noda 
more prone to pressure from bureaucrats’ use of a strategic approach. Once 
Noda was exposed to the MOF’s expertise, combined with Noda’s specialized 
knowledge on the tax issue gained from himself served as senior vice finance 
minister and head of that ministry for two years, it was easier for the Finance 
Ministry to convince the necessity of consumption tax on Noda.  
 
Tomoyuki Taira, a novice lawmaker, claimed that we all had this hope 
that we reached a historic change with the 2009 election victory and that this 
would guide Japan through a new era, “but it was actually easy for bureaucrats 
to manipulate someone with such naive elation and optimism” (Asahi Shimbun 
29
th
 June 2012). He further stated DPJ failed to pursue the politics of 
performance and, "now the bureaucracy is emerging as the sole player 
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controlling and propagating its vested interests, and the resumption of the Oi 
reactors is evidence of this Kafkaesque bureaucracy.” 
 
2.  Noda’s Cabinet Lineup and Relationship with Eijiro Katsu  
 
This section explores Noda’s cabinet lineup and investigates Noda’s 
relationship with MOF, particularly with Eijiro Katsu, administrative vice 
finance minister who wields enormous influence. On the evening of June 16, 
Ozawa’s associate clandestinely contacted Noda and conveyed Ozawa’s hope 
for Noda to freeze any increase in the consumption tax rate before June 20th 
when government and ruling party panel is scheduled to announce a proposal to 
increase the sales tax rate as part of a plan to reform the social security system. 
According to the associate to whom Noda responded that, “if he should readily 
freeze any move to raise the tax rate, he would lose the trust of the Finance 
Ministry and that would have a negative effect on managing the government” 
(Asahi Shimbun 20
th
 June 2011). Masato Hara, an editorial at Asahi Shimbun, 
in the discussion of “conspiracy theory”, has claimed that Noda is a “puppet” of 





Figure 2 Cabinet Lineup of Noda Administration 
 
                   (Source: Asahi Shimbun 2011/09/03)  
 
Beyond Kato’s theoretical framework, this study argues that 
bureaucrats not only strategically target reliable sponsors for their pursuing 
policy goals, but they also strategically educate young politicians and 
bureaucrats in advance and plant them into the Cabinet at the appropriate time 
in order to promote bureaucratic influence on policy-making and to finally 
achieve their goals. The suspicion grew with the replacement of Kinya Taiko, 
who often faced conflicts with the Finance Ministry, to Makoto Taketoshi. 
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Asahi Shimbun reported that, “former Finance Ministry officials had asked 
Noda to get rid of Takino, who locked horns with the Finance Ministry over 
local tax sources and other issues” (Asahi Shimbun 3
rd
 September 2011). 
According to Asahi Shimbun on September 3rd 2011, many bureaucrats were 
surprised by the appointment since it was uncommon for an incumbent 
administrative vice minister to become deputy chief Cabinet Secretary and it 
was the first time for an individual from the land ministry to be selected as 
deputy chief Cabinet Secretary. The close relationship of Taketoshi and Eijiro 
Katsu was accused as senior industry ministry official claimed that, "it was a 
pretty ingenious appointment, clearly masterminded by the Finance Ministry” 
(Asahi Shimbun 3
rd
 September 2011).  
 
Furthermore, “many bureaucrats believe the Finance Ministry pulled 
strings behind the scenes to secure the appointment of the deputy chief Cabinet 
secretary who oversees the nation's bureaucracy” (Asahi Shimbun 3
rd
 
September 2011). A senior ministry official further stated that, “(Taketoshi's 
appointment) was arranged by Katsu” and former finance minister further 
witnessed that "Taketoshi and Katsu are as tight as thieves. I've sat at the dinner 
table with them on many occasions” (Asahi Shimbun 3
rd
 September 2011). As 
shown in Figure 2, Noda maintains his trusts with the Administrative Vice 
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Finance Katsu and his ally Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Makoto Taketoshi. 
The September 9th
 
meeting, where 17 vice minister-level bureaucrats gathered 
at the Prime Minister's Official Residence, was also chaired by Taketoshi 
(Asahi Shimbun 10
th
 September 2011). Kato argues that bureaucrats rather 
strategically target politicians as “sharing policy information and knowledge 
with incumbent politicians is compatible with the promotion of bureaucratic 
influence in policy-making” (1994, 38). At this meeting, Taketoshi emphasized 
the importance of sharing information and “the meetings are useful for 
improving communications” and this regular Friday meetings of the senior 
officials becomes permanent under Noda (Asahi Shimbun 10
th
 September 2011). 
 
Takahashi Yoichi, a former Finance Ministry bureaucrat and an official in 
the Koizumi administration, sarcastically commented on the “real Japanese 
prime minister” and argues that Noda is the backstage prime minister 
(Takahashi 2011). Hasegawa Yukihiro, a member of the Tokyo Shimbun 
editorial board and college professor, explore the Noda’s administration and 
observe closely on his Cabinet lineup. He argues that Noda’s administration 
vividly shows an arrangement toward the policy of tax increase and, “also the 
consensus of opinion is that Katsu Eijiro, the administrative vice-minister for 
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the Finance Ministry, is the producer and scriptwriter for this administration 
that’s making a beeline to tax increases” (Hasegawa 2011). 
 
Hasegawa further argues that, “the reason for a structure with this depth of 
personnel is to suppress the anti-tax sentiment (in the party) and achieve a tax 
increase” (2011). Noda appointed Maehara Seiji, a former Foreign Minister, to 
the party’s policy chief who has important position on determining a policy, 
Sengoku Yoshito, a former Chief Cabinet Secretary and also known as 
Maehara’s ally, as the acting policy chief and Fujii Hirohisa, a former Finance 
Ministry bureaucrat and Finance Minister as the party’s tax policy chief 
(Hasegawa 2011). Takahashi further states that having LDP agreed to the tax 
increase, Finance Ministry wishes tax increase proposals will be initiated by the 
government and the key is how to supress the anti-tax elements in the party and 
“that’s why the priority in the selection of the personnel appointments was 
placed on the party rather than the government” (Takahashi 2011).   
 
Moreover, Motohisa Furukawa, a former Finance Ministry bureaucrat, 
was appointed by Noda as minister of economic and fiscal policy to oversee 
simultaneous reforms of taxes and social security. Asahi reported that, “Noda is 
considering reinstating the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, a powerful 
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body in the Koizumi administration, and having Furukawa take charge of 
discussions” (Asahi Shimbun 3
rd
 September 2011). A senior official from 
another ministry stated that, “(The setup) would give the Finance Ministry more 
opportunities to wield influence over policy discussions.” 
 
Takahashi argues that Noda’s “Cabinet itself consists of lightweights, 
but the Finance Ministry bureaucrats that were sent over are all heavyweights” 
(2011). Hasegawa further explains the reason for selecting lightweights for the 
Cabinet taking into account how much weight they placed on the party. Azumi 
Jun was selected as Finance Minister, who knows very little about financial 
policy, and Furukawa Motohisa as the Minister for National Policy who was the 
former Finance Ministry bureaucrat (Hasegawa 2011). “The Finance Ministry 
can completely control these two. Also key is the appointment of Katsu Eijiro 
as administrative vice-minister” (Hasegawa 2011). According to Asahi 
Shinbum, “Finance Ministry bureaucrats approached Azumi even before the 
change in government because he stood out for his handling of Diet affairs,” 
and the ministry has regularly held policy study session with Azumi, assigning 







Takahashi further assured that having a Tango Yasutake as a deputy 
Finance Minister is a clear giveaway of Finance Ministry control (2011). 
Furthermore, the choice of MOF to appoint Yoshii Hiroshi, a Finance Ministry 
mid-level senior bureaucrat who joined in 1988, as the parliamentary secretary 
for Ren Ho (the Minister of State for Government Revitalization) was another 
strategy since, “the portfolios of government revitalization and civil service 
reform given to Ren Ho are important for the bureaucracy, so it’s clear their 
objective is to keep a lid on it,” and in addition, “she has some star appeal for 
the DPJ, is a capable speaker, and attracts a lot of attention” (Takahashi 2011).  
 
Katsu’s personnel appointments were carefully thought out. Yoshii 
was sent over by Katsu, as a secretary, even when Ren Ho was a minister under 
Kan’s Cabinet (Takahashi 2011). Yoshii maintained his position as her advisor 
even when she was degraded to the job of special advisor to the prime minister, 
and served her ever since. “Mr. Katsu has perceived the value of using Ren Ho 
and so is keeping her marked” (Takahashi 2011).  Takahashi emphasized the 
strong ties and personnel network by the powerful trio including, Furukawa 
Motohisa, Ito Hideki and Yoshii Hiroshi who entered MOF in 1988 and shared 




 Asahi Shinbum reported that, Mitsuru Ota, a deputy director-general of 
the Budget Bureau, considered an ace bureaucrat, was also sent by the Finance 
Ministry as an aide to the prime minister (Asahi Shimbun 3
rd
 September 2011). 
Takahashi further explains, “with Ota Mitsuru of the class of 1983 as the prime 
minister’s parliamentary secretary, and the number of parliamentary secretaries 
they’ve had assigned, the Finance Ministry can pretty much run the Cabinet. To 
be blunt, they don’t care who the ministers are” (2011). Hasegawa also argues 
that, “Katsu has engineered a complete shift toward a tax increase both within 
the Cabinet and in the ministry” (2011). As early as October 5 2011, Takahashi, 
who had served as bureaucrat for the MOF, laid out the Katsu and Finance 
Ministry scenario: 
 
Noda was asked by the opposition whether he should take the issue to the 
people (in a general election) before increasing the consumption tax. The prime 
minister answered, ‘We will ask for their trust before it goes into effect.’ That 
seemed to satisfy both the public and the mass media, but there is no question 
that is a trap laid by the Finance Ministry. ‘Asking for their trust before the tax is 
raised’ usually means holding a lower house election on that issue, but ‘asking 
for their trust before it goes into effect’ means they will hold the election after the 
bill for the tax increase has passed and before it is implemented. In other words, 
they will submit and force through an increase in the consumption tax during the 
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regular session of the Diet next year, as is already planned. After that, they will 
hold an election at what they consider to be a suitable time. That way, because 
the bill has passed, the consumption tax will be raised whether or not the ruling 
party wins. (2011) 
 
Takahashi further argues that it is impossible to stop the tax increase by 
freezing legislation just before it goes into effect since there will not be 
sufficient time to submit a bill freezing the implementation if they hold a 
general election just before taxes are raised (2011). “That sort of schedule 
management is the forté of the Finance Ministry, and that’s why they sent all 
those accomplished people over to the Cabinet as parliamentary secretaries” 
(Takahashi 2011). 
 
The Nikkei newspaper on December 30th 2011 reported that when 
Noda came back from his trip to India, he immediately met with Finance 
Minister Jun Azumi and vice minister Eijiro Katsu to discuss the detail plans of 
the tax increase. After the discussion with Hirohisa Fujii and Seiji Maehara, 
“they decided that Noda would attend a joint session of Fujii's committee and a 
committee on tax and social security reform. The game plan was to build 
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support for committee members to give the chairman the final say” (The Nikkei 
30
th
 December 2011). 
 
Moreover, Zakaowsk further claims that the “conspiracy” grew when 
anti-mainstream politicians detected that the bill project had a paragraph that 
stipulated a necessity to implement another taxation reform by 2016 and “it 
turned out that the MOF bureaucrats had secretly modified the government 
decision from February 2012 in order to prepare the ground for further VAT 
hikes in the future” (Zakaowsk 179).  
 
Apart from the tax increase issue, Noda has been accused to be a 
mouthpiece of bureaucrats, “reactor restarts show Noda is a puppet of the 
bureaucrats” (Asahi Shimbun 29
th
 June 2012).  At the interview of Taira, he 
stated that the disappointment of “twisted” words from Noda lead his decision 
to resign from his political career. When Noda declared to resume operations of 
the two nuclear reactors in Fukui Prefecture to protect the lives of the people, 
Taira claimed that, “all I heard was the voice of government technocrats spilling 
out of the prime minister's mouth” (Asahi Shimbun 29
th




He further claimed that, "though we were entrusted by voters to bring 
common sense to politics, Noda and all the current executives of the DPJ have 
degenerated into mere 'speakers' of the bureaucracy, which has revealed its 
nature as a self-propagating machine.” Taira further analyzes Noda's recent 
speeches, including his June 26th statement on tax hike and argues that, “he 
uses intimidation rather than sincere efforts to win the public’s consent.” He 
further contends that, “the lawmaker described the DPJ's regime so far as a 
three-year process of the party falling under the initiative of bureaucrats.” And 
Noda’s “decision to restart the Oi reactors and the Lower House's passage of 
legislation to increase the consumption tax are ultimate victories of the 
bureaucracy” (Asahi Shimbun 29
th
 June 2012). 
 
3. Media and the Triple Disasters 
 
Kato does not assume that bureaucrats are superior to incumbent 
politicians in gathering information about social interests involving a certain 
policy issue, but rather in order to achieve policy objectives, bureaucrats need 
the cooperation of incumbent politicians who have links to social interests and 
to reduce opposition (Kato 1994, 11). This section argues that MOF controlling 
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the media skillfully persuaded the public for the need of a tax increase by using 
Noda and an external situation such as the Triple Disaster 2011. 
 
Table 1: Monthly Survey Results on the Consumption Tax Increase 
 
 
(Source: Asahi Shimbun Regular Public Opinion Poll, date organized by author) 
 
 Table 1 indicates the monthly public opinion poll conducted by Asahi 
Shimbun during Noda’s administration on the issue of consumption tax hike. 
Despite the assumption of a strong refusal from the public, other than January 
2012 and August 2012, there was a fairly even proportion of “agree” and 
“disagree” responses within the range of 40-50 percent. Moreover, surprisingly, 
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the decline of support in August 2012 increased to 43 percent in September 
2012. The Asahi Shimbun Regular Opinion Poll conducted on June 28 2012, 60 
percent did not support for Ozawa’s objection to the new tax hike whereas there 
was only 29 percent of support. When the question was asked whether it was 
necessary to raise the consumption tax in order to protect current social security 
measures, 60 percent answered “yes” and only 30 percent responded “no” (14
th
 
February 2012). Based on the opinion poll, the public generally understood the 
necessity of the tax increase. The Noda government itself launched a large-scale 
campaign in the media, “Noda himself appeared in the ads, explaining in simple 
words the need for the VAT hike” (Yomiuri shinbun seijibu 2012). On August 
27, Noda stated that, “it is the role of the ruling party to guide public opinion 
into accepting higher taxes because such a move is unavoidable,” to other 
candidates in the DPJ presidential election at the news conference (Asahi 
Shimbun 29
th
 August 2011). 
 
Similarly, Takahashi Fumitoshi argues that the consumption tax 
increase in 1997 was met with little public opposition with “careful 
manipulation of the news media by Ministry of Finance” (1999). Long before 
the tax increase, the MOF repeatedly emphasized the benefits of the tax would 
play in bolstering the economy but instead it caused the negative growth in 
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1997 and has contributed to the current prolonging of Japan’s recession. The 
one major reason why the consumption tax was raised without strong public 
resistance in 1997 is that the major daily newspapers believed it was 
unavoidable and thus did not try to oppose the MOF. Even if the major 
newspaper companies fully knew that the MOF had plans to gradually increase 
higher tax as opportunity arose, “they supported the increase because they were 
manipulated” (1999, 97).  
 
In order to manipulate the newspapers and thus the public, the MOF 
skillfully orchestrated the clash between the Asahi and Yomiuri editorials, and 
linked the demand for reduction in income tax to the increase in consumption 
tax (Fumitohsi 1999, 102). Fumitoshi states that, “Thanks to the clever 
manipulation of the major dailies by the Ministry of Finance early on, all of the 
newspapers had advocated the quick implementation of income tax deductions 
in exchange for a consumption tax increase, and thus they were in no position 
to condemn the consumption tax hike”(1999, 99). He further emphasis the role 
of “Study Session”: 
 
One of the main ways MOF managed to do this was its monthly ‘Study 
Sessions’ with the editorial staff of the major national newspapers, the Asahi, 
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Yomiuri, Mainichi, and Nikkei. These meetings are attended by high-ranking 
MOF officials, such as the heads of bureaus, and are a time for the 
government to conduct its own public relations. When necessary, “MOF 
officials meet with the editorial staff of each newspaper individually to make 
certain they are swayed by the MOF view. (102) 
 
 As Fumitoshi argues that the consumption tax did in fact contribute to 
Japan’s prolonged recession, in reality with regards to the consumption tax 
issue, the economists are divided. The economists argue that supporters say it 
was inevitable due to current and future fiscal conditions. Whereas, “opponents 
of the new tax hike say it [will] plunge Japan on to recession” just like past 
experiences and will eventually dampen consumption (The Economist 2012).  
 
 Hasegawa Yukihiro, a member of the Tokyo Shimbun editorial board, 
argues that, “if you dig just a little deeply, you find that the Finance Ministry is 
really driving the government,” and the pet reporters trying to find better 
relations with MOF bureaucrats since they will lose connections otherwise 
(Hasegawa 2011). “Nearly every day you can pick up the newspaper and read 
stories about the need for all sorts of taxes — income taxes, corporate taxes, 
inheritance taxes, environmental taxes” creating an atmosphere in which 
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everyone trusts that tax increases are unavoidable. He further argues that that 
strategy of MOF using the media, “and the person driving the Finance Ministry 
now is Katsu Eijiro” (Hasegawa 2011). 
 
Kimiko Kuga, in her newly published journal article, argues that, “a cozy 
relationship between authorities and affiliated journalists encouraged by the 
institution of Kisha Kurabu has created a structure in which journalist must take 
the side of the authorities and share similar values and norms with them” (2016, 
16). “Kisha Kurabu” refers to the associations of newspaper companies and 
television stations, and the journalist who is a part of Kisha Kurabu must work 
at one of the major newspaper companies or one of the key television stations. 
Based on the interviews with a member of Kisha Kurabu at the Ministry of 
Finance and experienced journalists---Youchi-asagake---she assures that in 
order to obtain new information they visit news sour’s house day and night and 
in the case of Kisha Kurabu member at the MOF, he visits the house belonging 
to the section manage at the Ministry almost every evening. In order to get 
information and such access, journalists attempt to develop good relationship 
with the sources and, “due to the such customs, all of my interviewees admitted 
that is was difficult for them to criticize their source and that they mostly tried 
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to find something congenial to say based on the information they were provided” 
(Kuga 2016). 
 
Furthermore, the horizontal relationships between journalists have 
developed a structure where nearly all newspapers take the same line on any 
particular event and if the journalists do not follow the rule, sections so called 
dekin “prevents journalist from gaining information on current events related to 
their affiliated authorities.” The worst scenario for the newspaper company is 
that it is the only one not provided with the information that every other ones 
printed in the newspaper or broadcast on air, and “Journalists at Kisha Kurabu 
therefore mostly tend to follow their news source’s requests even though some 
of them would constitute a restriction of press freedom” (Kuga 2016, 15). 
 
According to an article issued in Shukan Post on January 27, the major 
media “had fallen under the spell of the Ministry of Finance which has been 
pushing for a consumption tax increase forever and has always had Noda in its 
pocket” (Brasor 2012). Moreover, Shukan Post further assures that it is pretty 
sensational to the public that “the weekly equates the selling of the consumption 
tax under Noda” (Brasor 2012). On September 3rd 2011, Asahi Shimbun 
reported that Noda and Finance Ministry spoke as one on tax hike and Finance 
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Ministry mandarins’ long dream has come true, “who have long championed an 
increase in the composition tax rate”, by having Noda as their strong advocacy. 
There was no doubt that the MOF was giving its full support and backing to 
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and even “some DPJ lawmakers have taken 
potshots at Noda, saying his candidacy in the party's presidential election was 
tantamount to a ploy by Finance Ministry officials to ensure that taxes are 
raised” (Asahi Shimbun 3
rd
 September 2011). Noda met with senior Finance 
Ministry officials in the finance minister's office the day before the news 
conference on September 2nd and according to a senior ministry official who 
attained the conference, “he [Noda] essentially said he will raise taxes.”  
 
Former bureaucrats such as Shigeaki Koga and former DPJ leader 
Ozawa opposed the planned tax increase warning the future damage effect it 
will have to the economy, especially when it is struggling to the recovery from 
the Great East Japan Earthquake (Al-badri 2013, 57). In fact, “the more logical 
economic approach would be to not raise taxes after such a disaster because of 
the potential damage to domestic demand” (Duignan70). Despite the warnings, 
this thesis argues that the Triple Disasters that occurred in 2011, in fact, had 
contributed to the consumption tax hike in 2011 and the MOF took this external 
situation as a perfect method for it. According to Rene Duignan, sheer scale of 
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the 11 March 2011 tragedy has contributed to “finally waken an unprecedented 
sense of national solidarity and a public understanding of Japan’s collective 
fiscal responsibility” (2013). The Asahi opinion poll released in April 16, 2011 
reveals that almost 60 percent of respondents agree for idea of increasing taxes 
to fund earthquake disaster reconstruction whereas 31percent disagree. 
Moreover, when the question was asked which would be better source for the 
bulk of earthquake disaster reconstruction funding, 48 percent answered it as 
‘tax increase”. As Duignan argues, “the new sense of public responsibility came 
directly from the Tohoku disaster” (2013, 70).  
 
 The unfair reputation that the consumption tax was responsible for the 
bubble burst in 1990 or for the economic disruption resulted from Asia financial 
crisis in 1997, the public’s perception about the consumption tax has changed 
since the triple disaster (Duignan 2013). Thus this economic and moral 
epiphany enabled the government under Noda to firstly introduce “temporary” 
tax hikes in order to fund the large costs of reconstruction and “this created a 
momentum towards awareness of the fiscal burden facing future generations, 
which allowed authorities to take on the biggest economic and political 
challenge of all, raising the consumption tax.” As numerous public opinion 
polls revealed for the support for the temporary tax, “ordinary people believing 
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that the costs of reconstruction should not just be pushed to the next generation” 
which was truly a landmark occurrence” (Duignan 2013, 76). 
 
The Reconstruction Design Council in response to the Great East 
Earthquake state that, “the direct cost of the disaster is expected to reach 
approximately 16.9 trillion yen” and emphasized the need for tax increase, “the 
financial resources for recovery and reconstruction must be secured by the 
entire currently living generation ... and the government should take specific 
measures for a temporary increase in taxes, especially centered on key taxes...” 
(2011, 36).  Moreover, the Reconstruction Headquarters in response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake was formed announcing “Basic Guidelines for 
Reconstruction” one month later its establishment. It emphasized “the main 
administrative actors accountable for the reconstruction shall be municipalities” 
and stated that, “temporary taxation measures” will observed as the financial 
resources (2011, 7). A Former Minister of Public Management, Yoshihiro 
Katayama, argued that, “the Ministry of Finance took the earthquake as a 
perfect occasion to raise tax” (Katayama and Uno 2011).  
 
It is not that the MOF’s use of the media in order to convince the public 
that necessity of tax increase for the burden caused for the Triple Disaster is the 
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problem. Moreover, problem is not the Triple Disasters that itself has 
contributed in the waking the public awareness for raising taxes. Rather, the 
problem is the MOF using Triple Disasters in order to push the consumption tax 
increase without satisfactory reconstruction policy. Fukuo Akimoto summarizes 
Katayama’s criticism towards government’s reconstruction policy on 




Since April I was adamant at the cabinet meetings that the national government 
should immediately decide financial assistance programs for local governments 
including land acquisition program, and then urge local governments to provide 
reconstruction plans quickly. This argument was based on my own experience 
as prefectural governor after the Tottori Prefecture Western Earthquake on 
October 6, 2000. Nearly ten days after the quake, when the prefectural 
government announced a new program to grant three million yen to each 
completely-destroyed house owner directly, people promptly went outside to 
search for builders. Later people told me that it was a kind of mental care. 
However, this time I was in a minority within the cabinet. A majority 
emphasized that the government should request local governments to prepare a 
reconstruction plan first, then examine these plans and determine financial 
assistance programs later. This attitude did not uplift the sufferers. Why did it 
happen? The Kan cabinet decided to raise tax first before providing financial 
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assistance program, assuming that tax increase is necessary to secure financial 
resources for reconstruction. (Akimoto 2012). 
 
Figure 3. Public Opinion Survey on Consumption Tax Hike 
 
 
Source (The Nikkei 2012/01/20) 
 
Aside from the Triple Disasters, the MOF has always been pushing for 
higher taxes with the fiscal burden on social security system along with rapid 
aging society. Figure 3 represents a public opinion survey conducted by the 
Nikkei published on February 20th, 2012, Tango Yasutake, a top bureaucrat, 
argues that most of citizens in Japan recognize that the fiscal situation on 
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nation’s social security system, and understand the necessity for a consumption 
tax hike to secure revenue for this. Based on the figure 3, he further argues, 
“that many newspapers and other media outlets are calling on the government 
and the ruling and opposition parties to hold talks on the issue without delay in 
order to start the integrated reforms of the taxation and social security systems 
as soon as possible” (Yasutake 2012). Although it is very difficult to determine 
whether it is the other way around, what Noda did not realize is that even 
Japanese citizens generally agree upon the need of increasing consumption tax, 
when it is about to be actually carried out, then there is strong resistance. When 
the question is asked whether the consumption tax hike is necessary to maintain 
in the social security system, almost 60 percent responded “Yes” whereas 29 
percent said “No”. However, when the question specifically asks that it will be 
implemented by up to 10 percent by 2015, only 40 percent of respondents 
approved whereas 49 percent disapproved. “Noda did not realize that this would 
initiate a voters’ revolt against the party just as the Japanese electorate did in 
the 1989 upper house election and the 1997 upper house election” (Park 2015, 
12). Furthermore, “in the eyes of the electorate, the DPJ did not keep their 





4. Ozawa Ichiro vs. Yoshihiko Noda 
 
When the raising the tax bill was passed, former party president Ozawa 
Ichirō, 38 members of the lower house and 12 members of the upper house, the 
House of Councilors, left the DPJ on July 2nd. The conflict between Noda and 
Ozawa was highlighted when the Noda’s Cabinet approved the consumption tax 
bill on March 30th. Four subcabinet members of the Ozawa group resigned in 
protest (Shinoda 2013). Asahi Shimbun reported that Ozawa’s “strategy is 
faltering as opposition to Noda is more virulent than expected” (22rd August 
2011). In this section of the thesis, it argues that Ozawa Ichiro could penetrate 
Noda’s underlying force behind the decision on sales tax increase as himself, 
once was a victim of danced to MOF’s tune. 
 
Aurelia George Mulgan in the “Ozawa Ichiro and Japanese Politics” 
claims that Ozawa’s stance on the consumption tax was prominently 
inconsistent (2014, 41). He explains how Ozawa played a central role in 
initiating the consumption tax in 1989 under the Takeshita administration. 
Moreover, in the replacement of the consumption tax, Ozawa was eager to push 
a “national welfare tax” of 7 percent under the Hosokawa government. This was 
known as “a conspiracy between Ozawa Ichiro and the MOF” which was under 
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Ozawa’s leadership without any consultation with coalition partners and faced 
fierce opposition within ruling party executives. Due the long recession, the 
proposal was withdrawn, but it eventually resulted in the collapse of the 
Hosokawa administration despites its high popularity at the time. Later Ozawa 
appeared on the TV program and said, “We have to do what we can do before 
we are faced with a super-ageing society” (Mulgan 2014, 14). 
 
Despite the fact that after the mid-1990s and onwards, Ozawa himself 
left the idea of increasing the consumption tax and named himself as a radical 
politician for the 1995’s NFP leadership election (Mulgan 2014, 41). In the 
reference to Ishihara Kan, “The Way Bureaucrats Should Be,” Shinoda argues 
that the Ministry of Finance strategically approached Ozawa as the essential 
person to the tax reform since Ozawa believed “healthy government finances 
with a balanced budget” (Shinoda 2013). Furthermore, Curtis has stated that 
“during the Hosokawa Administration, the vice minister of the MOF openly 
aligned himself with Ozawa Ichiro to try to force an increase in the 
consumption tax…..in the process, he brought down a torrent of criticism on 
MOf for using its overt interference in the political process” (2002). Asahi 
Shimbun on 2011 August 10th, conducts interview with Morihiro Hosokawa, 
who became prime minister in 1993 as a non-LDP member. According to the 
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interview, Hosokawa blamed the Finance Ministry for trying to take advantage 
of his administration’s high popularity in pushing for the new levy. He further 
recalls that, “The Kasumigaseki bureaucracy, joining forces with a panel of 
coalition party representatives (including Ozawa), was pushing for it” (Asahi 
Shimbun 10
th
 August 2011). 
 
Under the Kan administration, Ozawa denounced Kan “of following a 
typical MOF budgetary approach in pressing his ministers to cut their 2011 
policy-related budget requests by a minimum of 10 per cent, rather than 
asserting political leadership over policymaking” (Mulgan 2014, 159). He 
blamed the budget-making role of the MOF and assured that, “Kasumigaseki 
decides everything and administration and budget distribution is done following 
their menu,” and “we must build a system in Japan under which politicians can 
be responsible for making policies and deciding on budgets by themselves” 
(Mulgan 2014). Though Ozawa still acknowledges the importance of a tax 
increase, Ozawa stated his mantra learned from his previous experience, “don’t 
entrust it to the bureaucracy; politicians should make decisions and implement 
these decisions" (Mulgan 2014, 159). In his book, “Kataru” he discusses about 
how he has been an advocate of tax increase but now he “knows all too well 





 July 2010). Therefore, Ozawa’s “election-first principle” 
now caused a conflict when Noda’s proposed the consumption tax increase. 
 
This section contends that Ozawa’s strong resistance toward Noda’s 
decision to raise tax vividly show Ozawa’s past experience of learning the 
intention of bureaucrats and its  final consequences.  Ozawa has made fun of 
Noda as he described him as the “officially endorsed candidate” of the Finance 
Ministry for the DPJ presidential election at the meetings with close associates 
on 14th of June (Asahi Shimbun 20
th
 June). Ozawa told to associate, “even 
though he [Noda] is close to the Finance Ministry that means conversely that he 
knows what ministry officials are thinking” (Asahi Shimbun 20
th
 June 2011). 
Ozawa again criticized Noda publicly as “Ozawa saw Noda becoming a puppet 
of the bureaucratic veto players at the MOF like Kan had done, and as violating 






Table 2: Monthly Survey Results on the Support of Prime Minister Noda. 
 
(Source: Asahi Shimbun Regular Public Opinion Poll, date organized by author) 
 
Table 2 indicates a monthly public opinion poll on the support rate of 
the prime minister. Noda’s higher support rate of 53 percent in September 2011 
dropped considerably to 18 percent by November 2012 and his ‘do not support’ 
rate increased from as low as 18 percent up to 58 percent. Noda was no 
exception to the public popularity when it comes to the issue of raising tax. As 
“talking about a tax increase has cost many politicians their political lives,” 
Noda eventually lost the next election. Contradicting the rationale theory choice 
where a politician’s main goal is to get elected and re-elected, Noda had staked 
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his political life on the success of the policy. This chapter has analyzed the 
underlying force that impacted Noda’s decision. 
  
Applying Kato’s framework on Noda’s case on the consumption tax 
increase and to summarize, MOF has targeted Noda as “the bureaucrats need to 
find political sponsors for their proposed policy” (Kato 1994, 11). In turn, this 
section argues that Noda was the perfect candidate for a bureaucrat to target for 
two reasons. First, Noda lacked experience managing big organization, had 
never worked as bureaucrat of white-collar worker (Zakaowski 2015). This 
background has made Noda to rely on bureaucratic advertise and also made him 
more prone to bureaucrats strategic persuasion. Second, as Noda himself has 
background of serving as Finance Minister, he has gained specialized 
knowledge prior exposure to MOF, “likely to accept if they consider the 
bureaucrats’ proposal is sensible in terms of their specialized knowledge and 
acquired expertise” (Kato 1994). As Noda has “served as finance minister under 
the Kan administration, was convinced by MOF officials of the need for fiscal 
reconstruction” (Shinoda 2012, 821). The bureaucrats’ expertise were used 
strategically on Noda to gain influence since “sharing policy information and 
knowledge with incumbent politicians is compatible with the promotion of 
bureaucratic influence in policy-making” (Kato 1994, 38).  
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The evidence was investigated through internal factors such as Noda’s 
Administration, Cabinet lineup and Noda’s personal background. Next, external 
situation was examined through media and how the Triple Disaster in 2011 was 
used. In turn, this chapter argued that the MOF’s strategic approach, especially 
Eijiro Katsu personnel appointments where “Cabinet itself consists of 
lightweights, but the Finance Ministry bureaucrats that were sent over are all 
heavyweights”, made Noda all more vulnerable MOF’s persuasion and played 
crucial role impacting on Noda’s decision-making process. This chapter ends 
with a comparison of Noda and Ozawa. Ozawa did not deny the fact that a 
consumption tax hike is an important matter, but he insisted that the pre-
requisites are imperative and that policy-making has to be done by politicians. 
Perhaps, with pricey lesson in the past, Ozawa, as a politician, now knows all 





Chapter 4: Revival of Bureaucracy   
 
 Chapter three analyzed as the internal factor of how and why 
bureaucrats, focusing on the MOF, targeted Noda as a sponsor for achieving 
their long dream of a consumption tax hike. This chapter further observes the 
conditions that led Noda to become more vulnerable to the MOF even before he 
took office as the prime minister, explaining why Noda had no choice but to 
rely on bureaucrats in the first place. In turn, this chapter argues that 
bureaucrats’ strategic recovery of their power initiated soon after Hatoyama’s 
declaration of war on them and gradually, but surely carried out the preparation 
for the consumption tax increase.  
 
In 1994, Kato argues that Japan had a predominant party system in 
“which the policy-making process was institutionalized between the 
bureaucracy and the party in power to an extent greater than in other systems 
experiencing frequent alterations in party government” (1994, 233). Kato stated 
that under this system, the policy-making process was based on the interaction 
of bureaucrats and the same incumbent party, but excluded the opposition 
parties. Moreover, it was possible for bureaucrats to expect the passage of bills 
approved by the LDP leadership, since the LDP had a relatively strong party 
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discipline and continuous control of the government. She further insists that in 
such a system, bureaucratic efforts to influence policy-making significantly 
alter policy outcomes and thus, bureaucrats focused their efforts on attaining the 
LDP’s approval for a proposed policy. She finally contends that, “an 
unchanging incumbent party provides stable circumstances in which 
bureaucrats can pursue their desired policies” and “an unchanging incumbent 
party and the stability of the bureaucratic organization make the observations of 
interaction between the two groups easier” (Kato 1994, 14).  
 
This chapter as the final one of this thesis aims to challenge the 
argument and assures that the consumption tax increase in 2012, the long-
pursued goal of MOF, was possible because it was under DPJ. In other words, 
starting from the changes in the incumbent party, the confusion and instability 
of DPJ’s setting, its crisis in crisis management enabled bureaucrats to finally 
achieve their long dreamed goal of consumption tax increase. 
 
1. A New Inexperienced Incumbent Party 
 
 In 2009, Asahi Shimbun reported that an influential DPJ lawmaker 
claimed that “in egregious cases the party was prepared to hold a public 
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execution in Kasumigaseki" (7
th
 October 2009). Despite their initial expectation, 
“public execution” of DPJ was carried just about three years since they came 
into power. The purpose of this section is not to provide an analysis on the fall 
of DPJ or on their inability, but rather to focus on how the MOF benefited from 
this. Thus, this section of thesis focuses on incidences and backgrounds that 
result in the revival of bureaucracy.  
 
The Yomiuri Opinion poll conducted in November 21st, 2009 shows a 
64 percent support rate and the Nikkei Shimbun Opinion poll conducted in July 
3rd, 2009 indicates the support rate of Hatoyama government was over 65 
percent. The Asahi Shimbun opinion poll conducted in June 2009 shows 60 
percent of respondents had high expectations for future changes in government. 
Nevertheless, just two years after DPJ took power, over 80 percent of voters 
were dissatisfied with the politics (Asahi Shimbun 26
th





Figure 4. Party Approval Rate Compared DPJ and LDP 
 
(Source : Asahi Shimbun 2012/12/26) 
 
 The survey was carried out from Asahi Shimbun in November to mid-
December through the form of questionnaires mailed out to 3,000 eligible 
voters nationwide and 75 percent provided valid responses. Only 15 percent 
answered that they were rather satisfied with the political situation and only 1 
percent answered that he/she was fully satisfied with the DPJ’s politics so far. 
Moreover, 73 percent responded “no” to the question when asked whether the 
politics have changed since the DPJ took over the government from the LDP in 
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September 2009. Figure 4 represents the percentage compared to the 
performance of DPJ with LDP. In contradiction to DPJ’s manifesto which aims 
that politicians take the initiative over bureaucrats, LDP rather marks significant 
higher percentage over “leadership over bureaucrats”(26
th
 December 2012). 
 
Figure 5. DPJ Members’ Self-assessments on Issue of Party’s Management over 
Bureaucrats  
 
(Source RJIF: Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation) 
 
The Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation conducted Surveys of DPJ 
members and their self-assessments on party governance, which was conducted 
on 45 members including the incumbent DPJ Lower House lawmakers. The 
question that was asked was explicitly about the party’s management over 
Bureaucrats. According to RJIF, zero respondents has responded to it as “it 
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went well” and only 8 DPJ member answered it as “it went well at some degree.” 
The majority of members (a total of 34 respondents) admitted and responded 
that “it did not go well” which equated to 76 percent. Two people responded 
with “it went bad” (Nakano 2013).  
 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 5, the question additionally asked for 
the reasons for the failures. 33 percent of DPJ members responded that is was 
due to politicians’ insufficient knowledge and experience. Surprisingly, 22 
percent of members, in fact, blamed government for the exclusion of 
bureaucrats. They answered that this exclusion had rather brought on the failure 
of the management of bureaucracy under DPJ. 13 percent of respondents 
answered that it was due to politicians’ insufficient concern and desires toward 
a “politician-led government” and 7 percent of respondents answered that it was 
because they did not establish a proper National Strategy Bureau. 
 
When DPJ declared “a game of outfoxing the foxes,” there was a 
growing concern that the battle with bureaucrats will eventually end up in a 
quagmire for DPJ (Asahi Shimbun 7
th
 October 2009). As early as October 7th 
2009, Asahi Shimbun reported that, “there is the danger that bureaucrats could 
take advantage of confusion among the three parties making up the coalition 
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government,” and “there is also the possibility of bureaucratic opportunists 
emerging,” such as to introduce a national welfare tax. Two years later, the 
Asahi news report on September 10th, 2011 claims that, “two years after taking 
office promising to cut senior bureaucrats down to size, the Democratic Party of 
Japan is realizing it may need the help of the mandarins after all.” Contrary to 
the confidence at the first election slogan, Hatoyama's administration went 
through troubles as soon as the information from the bureaucratic machine 
began to dry up following its reforms.  
 
Kan Naoto, when he was under the Hatoyama Cabinet, displayed his 
anti-bureaucratic stance. On October 31st, 2009 at the DPJ meeting in Tokyo, 
Kan had stated that, “[Bureaucrats] do not use their brains. They just got good 
grades [in their school days], but they are very stupid” (Yomiuri 1
st
 November 
2009). As Hatoyama, Kan first rebuffed the memos that bureaucrats prepared 
for his statements on official events and refused the political tradition of relying 
on them (Shinoda 2012, 813). Shinoda, however, argues that, “his attitude 
totally changed when he served as finance minister” (2012, 813). “Kan 
suddenly proposed discussion of a consumption tax hike—which was not in the 
party manifesto but was strongly backed by the Finance Ministry—inviting 
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Asahi shimbun September 20th 2011, claims Kan’s Cabinet was dismal 
and erratic and provided reasons why it had gone badly awry: 
 
First, both the prime ministers--Kan and his predecessor Yukio Hatoyama--as 
well as the three top political officials of ministries and agencies--ministers, 
senior vice ministers and parliamentary secretaries-- were not experienced in 
running the government or executing policies. Secondly, a considerable 
number of DPJ politicians mistook arbitrary decision-making and execution 
for political control over policymaking. Thirdly, no effective system existed 
to work out the differing interests of ministries over policy decisions. (2011) 
 
It is surprising that the results of figure 5 where showed that 22 percent 
of members, in fact, blamed the government for the exclusion of bureaucrats 
and that they believed that this exclusion had brought on the failure of the 
management of bureaucracy under DPJ. Koga, based on a comparison of 
Japanese government to a bus company, Koga explained that, “the politicians 
were the managers while the bureaucrats were the drivers” (Ito 2012). And “the 
DPJ’s biggest mistake was eliminating the bureaucrats. . . . It is natural for 
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politicians to lack the ability to do the job of the bureaucrats because what they 
need to do is decide on the big picture, the policies, and adjust interests”(Ito 
2012). 
 
Makihara Izuru further argues that their attempts to make policy by 
themselves while excluding the bureaucrats from the process were not possible 
from the start. When the DPJ decided to exclude bureaucrats in policy making, 
Izuru argues, “people filling these three positions are not policy experts, and it 
has proved impossible for them to come up with policy proposals without 
involving the bureaucrats” (2011). Furthermore, he claims these attempts 
eventually result in needless confusion in the ministries (Izuru 2011). 
Furthermore, Kenji E. Kushida and Philip Y Lipscy, in their book “Japan under 
the DPJ: The Politics of Transition and Governance” further argues that the 
mantra of empowering politicians against an elite bureaucracy ironically acted 
as a constraint on the DPJ’s ability to implement its reform agenda” (2015). 
 
Based on the example of the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air 
Station Futenma, Asahi reported that DPJ “exposed problems with the new 
policymaking structure and politicians' vulnerability without bureaucratic 
support” (Asahi Shimbun 10
th
 September 2011). Another example during the 
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Noda government, Ichikawa Yasuo, formal ministers of defense, was replaced 
by Tanaka Naoki for being an amateur in security policy and for his ignorance 
on basic security issues. However, Tanaka further proved to be “unsuitable for 
this post as his predecessor” and he “tried to cover up his lack of specialist 
knowledge by relying heavily on the memos prepared by the bureaucrats” 
(Zakaowski 2015, 159). In fact, almost no one from Noda’s Cabinet had enough 
experience and knowledge to professionally understand the constitution on 
difficult legislative and this led the Cabinet Legislation Bureau director-general 
to resume answering Diet interpellations (Zakaowski 2015, 159). Furthermore, 
Kushida and Lipscy further argue that because the DPJ lacked “an effective 
mechanism to coordinate policy within the party, the outcome was widespread 
confusion and uncertainty about the governments’ objective and policy goals” 
(2015). For example, the Foreign Ministry officials often complained that they 
did not know what Japan’s official position was on major policies (Kushida and 
Lipscy 2015). 
 
Asahi report on August 27th in 2011 reported that in January, Kan had 
confessed that “the ruling party’s drive to reduce bureaucratic control of 
decision making had caused significant problems” to a group of administrative 
vice ministers and other top-ranking bureaucrats. Kan stated, “(governance led 
 
81 
by politicians) has caused various problems in the management of nation’s 
politics” and “there are issues we should reflect on: whether we went too far or 
whether we were inadequate” (Asahi Shimbun 27
th
 August 2011).  January 
2011 Prime Minister Kan made a speech for asking cooperation among 
bureaucrats:  
 
“There have been trials and errors in the relationship between politicians 
and bureaucrats. In each ministry, I would like you to discuss with the 
minister and senior vice minister and make an agreement on the kinds of 
cases that should be handled solely by politicians, and others that should 
require involvement of the vice minister and other high bureaucratic 
officials. I would hope to establish a good form of cooperative relations 
between them” (Shinoda 2013). 
 
This section further enhanced the understanding of how Noda became 
more vulnerable to MOF persuasion even before taking the office as a prime 
minister who had no choice but to rely on their expertise. Hatoyama’s failure 
and Kan’s lack of capability to deal with emergency incidents ultimately formed 
the concept of a politician-led government on major newspapers, “of being only 
‘immature,’ but also ‘dangerous’” (Zakaowski 2015, 205). The failure of both 
Hatoyama and Kan, in fact, made Prime Minister Noda to “end the risky gambit 
 
82 
and return to many LDP like practices” (Zakaowski 2015, 205). 
 
2. Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami: crisis and crisis management 
 
 Figure 6. Trust in Central Government Before and After the Disaster  
 
(Source: The survey research on “Public Trust in Government” Akira Nakamura) 
 
 The Great East Japan Earthquake is fundamentally different from the 
Great Kato Earthquake back in the 1920s in terms of reconstruction efforts and 
transparency on the decision-making process. Hiroko Oota, the former 
Economic and Fiscal Policy Minister, criticized DPJ’s effort and state that, 
“although they [DPJ] came to power by promising to improve the transparency 
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of policy decision process, they damaged it. ... To ensure it, it is necessary that 
people can later examine the policy making process. ... However, they have not 
kept the minutes of the meeting at all” (2011). Figure 6 represents the public 
trust in government before and after the disaster. It shows a steady decline from 
pre-disaster of January of 18.5 percent to a post-disaster rating of 14.5 percent 
in March and a low of 12.4 percent April 15th. In addition, the Asahi public 
poll indicated that 71 percent of respondents disapproved of the efforts of the 
DPJ-led government to reconstruct disaster areas and the crisis at the 
Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant. In contrast, only 25 percent approved of 
the government's efforts (Asahi Shimbun 22
nd
 October 2012). Moreover, 28 
percent of the respondents said they were totally dissatisfied with the political 
situation since the March 11th Great East Japan Earthquake and 52 percent said 
they were rather dissatisfied with it (Asahi Shimbum 26
th
 December 2011). 
 
Bureaucrats took advantage of the DPJ’s lack of crisis-management 
skills on the triple disasters and the aftermath which left the government no 
choice but to rely on them. T.J Pemple stated that in the “wake of the triple 
disaster of 3/11 DPJ demonstrated minimal effective crisis management” (T.J 
Pemple 2012). Furthermore, Shinoda argues that “the lack of experience of 
inter-agency coordination during the 18 months under the DPJ government 
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indeed did cause a crisis in the crisis-management system” (Shinoda 2012). 
Izuru further argues, “that said, since the March earthquake the bureaucrats 
have once again begun to take the initiative in proposing recovery measures and 
reconstruction policies” (Izuru 2011). 
 
For policy coordination on disaster relief, Yoshito Sengoku, Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, eventually decided to assemble liaison meetings among key 
ministries and agencies, attended by their top bureaucrats. According to 
Shinoda, “this was in fact a revival of the administrative vice-ministerial 
meeting, although it was limited to the goal of victim support” (Shinoda 2013). 
This regular liaison meeting gave opportunities for top bureaucrats to 
coordinate action and exchange information. Though the meeting was aimed for 
disaster relief, inter-agency coordination was needed at various working levels. 
“Under the traditional bottom-up policy making process in the LDP government, 
bureaucratic officers at the deputy director level began inter-agency 
negotiations. These continued at the director level as well as the bureau chief 






3. MOF’s Strategic Approach 
 
 This section argues that in contradiction to their initial manifesto, the 
inexperienced new ruling party rather excessively increased bureaucratic 
influence. Furthermore, Cheol Hee Park, a professor at Seoul National 
University and a Japanese specialist, argues that “their promise that politicians 
would take the lead in policy formation fell short because the DPJ did not have 
independent think tanks or policy innovators of their own, and so ended up 
listening to experience bureaucrats” (Park 2015, 25). In fact, “the Finance 
Ministry has gained more clout under successive DPJ administrations, winning 
over prime ministers Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan and now Yoshihiko Noda” 
(Asahi Shimbun 5
th
 April 2012). Masuzoe Yoichi, the Head of the New 
Renaissance Party, argues that “in the end, the DPJ proved no match for the 
counterattack launched by the bureaucracy, which could draw on the power of 
its own specialized knowledge, and gradually the bureaucracy gained 
hegemony over the policymaking process” (Masuzoe 2012).  
 
On January 15, 2011, Asahi Shimbun introduces the Kan’s new 
Cabinet lineup and claims that Kan will rely more on bureaucrats to deal with a 
divided Diet and get legislation enacted. Kent Calder, a expert at Japanese 
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politics and director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the 
School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, said, 
“the appointment of Kaoru Yosano as state minister in charge of economic and 
fiscal policy was a sign that Kan was moving back toward allowing greater 
input from central government bureaucrats” (Asahi Shimbun 15
th
 January 2011). 
He further argues that this indicates a “realization that Kan needs more 
experienced people” (10
th
 September 2011). Furthermore, Calder insists that the 
appointment of Hirohisa Fuiji, a veteran lawmaker, as the deputy chief Cabinet 
secretary indicates another change in Kan administration as Fuiji, “has served 
as finance minister and knows the inner workings of the central government 
bureaucracy, having worked in the Finance Ministry himself” (Asahi Shimbun 
15
th
 January 2011). He concludes that this is clearly different from Hatoyama 
administration which shows that Kan has learned from Hatoyama's mistakes.  
 
On April 5, 2012 Asahi Shimbun, reported that despite the DPJ’s initial 
pledges to decrease power of bureaucrats and put politicians in charge, “it never 
challenged the Finance Ministry, the bastion of the nation’s bureaucratic 
hierarchy” (Asahi Shimbun 5
th
 April 2012). Keisuke Tsumura, a parliamentary 
secretary charge of national policy, explains how the DPJ’s strategy collapsed. 
When Kan was still a national policy minister back in late September 2009, he 
 
87 
faced challenges due to the government’s inability to decide on a basic budget 
policy with the issue revenue shortages for the DPJ’s campaign policies. That is 





Kan sought advice for the timing of drawing up a basic budget if the 
budget was to be complied by the end of the year. Katsu said, “The DPJ has a 
grand manifesto,” and “if you issue a sheet of paper and tell us to compile the 
budget based on the manifesto, we will follow the instruction.” The meeting 
effectively placed Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii, not Kan “in charge of 
compiling the budget under the first DPJ administration” (Asahi Shimbun 5
th
 
April 2012). Fujii, the 79 year old former Finance Ministry bureaucrat, said, “I 
don't think politicians can make correct judgments on details of the budget.” He 
further claimed that, “the Finance Ministry has a tradition encompassing more 
than a century. What is expected of politicians is to make decisions.” 
  
This section reveals that this was a critical moment for when DPJ fell 
under the trap. Despite Kan’s initial anti-bureaucratic stance and DPJ’s election 
manifesto, the new ruling party’s lack of knowledge and management skills 
gave way for a chance for the revival of bureaucrats. Furthermore, “Fujii was 
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instrumental in installing Noda as senior vice finance minister under him” 
(Asahi Shimbun 5
th
 April 2012). The book Noda wrote before the DPJ came as 
a ruling party, Noda did mention the necessity of cutting wasteful spending and 
to stop bureaucrats from landing cushy post-retirement jobs, “but not a line 
touched on a consumption tax hike” (Asahi Shimbun 5
th
 April 2012). 
Nevertheless, “Noda suddenly turned into a tax hike advocate after he was 
appointed senior vice finance minister.” 
 
Ever since, the DPJ administration constantly set out the ground for the 
consumption tax increase under Kan. Kan, suddenly called for a consumption 
tax hike before the 2010 House election where Noda appeared “a leading voice 
of the Finance Ministry's arguments in the political world after he was 
promoted to finance minister under Kan” (Asahi Shimbun 5
th
 April 2012). Both 
of them have the experience of serving as finance ministers and then took 
power as prime ministers. Before the DPJ presidential election in 2011, through 
the intermediation of bureaucrats of MOF, Noda met former finance ministers 
of LDP. It came as surprise to the political world when Noda appointed Jun 
Azumi as his first Cabinet portfolio and as the finance minister. But what is 
more important is that, as mentioned in chapter 3, the “Finance Ministry 
bureaucrats approached Azumi even before the change in government because 
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he stood out for his handling of Diet affairs.” According to Asahi Shinbum, 
“the ministry has regularly held policy study meetings for Azumi, assigning 
Shigeaki Okamoto, a budget examiner and his acquaintance, as a lecturer,” and 
“Okamoto now supports Azumi as director-general of the Finance Ministry’s 
Secretarial Division” (Asahi Shimbun 5
th
 April 2012). 
 
Even before the DPJ took power, on July 2009, Yasutake Tango, the 
MOF’s top bureaucrats have said, “his ministry will prepare to raise the 
consumption tax as stipulated by law, but it is also ready to change course if the 
Democratic Party of Japan, which is reportedly against a consumption tax hike 
over the next four years, takes power” (Fukada 2009). At the interview with The 
Japan Times, Tango satated that, “First, it is basic that we will make various 
preparations in accordance with them”. Tango further claimed that even if the 
government changes and DPJ decides not to raise consumption tax, “his 
ministry will serve the new Cabinet members,” however, “we believe it is our 
role to appropriately assist the prime minister and the finance minister” (Fukada 
2009). He further urged the current economic situation and explained the 
MOF’s future fiscal plans, “we would like to make efforts so that we will be 




Chapter three has discussed how the MOF, under the instruction of 
Eijiro Katsu, strategically targeted Noda and persuaded him to be its sponsor 
for consumption tax hike. This chapter argues that the MOF’s attempt for their 
revival was, in fact, initiated soon after the Hatoyama’s declaration of war on 
them. This thesis further assures that this was not too challenging for 
bureaucrats do so since the new ruling party lack knowledge and management 
skills. Kan’s initial anti-bureaucratic stance soon turned into reliance on MOF 
due to government’s inability and that’s when Katsu appeared. Going back to 
chapter three, Katsu plays fundamental role in Noda’s decision making process 
by planting his personnel appointments in Noda’s Cabinet.  The critical 
moment is when Katsu plant Fujii to take charge of compiling the budget under 
DPJ as Fujii acted as an instrumental in installing Noda as senior vice finance 
minister under him. By the time Noda took the helm, “it appeared the DPJ was 
under the control of the bureaucrats, with the biggest example being his key 
goal of hiking the consumption tax — a long-sought goal of the Finance 







4. Morihiro Hosokawa case:  
 
The LDP has been the pre-dominant ruling party since 1955---except 
for a brief 11 month period between 1993 and 1995 and from 2009 to 2012. 
Kato contends that “an unchanging incumbent party provides stable 
circumstances in which bureaucrats can pursue their desired policies” (Kato 
1994, 14) and increase their influence. However, those brief periods, where 
there were changes in the incumbent party, the bureaucrats could expand their 
influence on the tax increase. Morihiro Hosokawa became the first non-LDP 
prime minister in September 1993. At the interview with Asahi Shinbum on 
August 2011 with him, Hosokawa blamed the Finance Ministry for trying to 
“take advantage of his administration’s high popularity in pushing for the new 
levy” (10
th
 August 2011). He assures that, “The Kasumigaseki bureaucracy, 
joining forces with panel of coalition party representatives (including Ozawa), 
was pushing for it” (Asahi Shimbun 10
th
 August 2011). 
 
Mulgan contends that Ozawa was passionate in pushing a “national 
welfare tax” of 7 percent under Hosokawa government and this known as “a 
conspiracy between Ozawa Ichiro and the MOF” (Mulgan 2014, 41). In the 
reference to Ishihara Kan, Shinoda further assures that the Ministry of Finance 
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strategically approached Ozawas as the necessary person to the tax reform since 
Ozawa shares belief that “healthy government finances with a balanced budget” 
(Shinoda, 2013). The pressured eventually led Hosokawa to accept the need for 
the consumption tax increase and announced the plan of ‘kokumin fukushizei 
(national welfare tax). Masayoshi Takemura, Chief Cabinet Secretary and 
leader of New Party Harbinger at the time, strongly opposed the reform. Ozawa, 
in turn, requested Hosokawa to removed Takemura (Mulgan 2014). However, 
the internal party dispute ended when the proposal was withdrawn which 
eventually resulted in the collapse of the Hosokawa administration, despite its 
high popularity at the time.  
 
In the case of Hasokawa, a Prime Minister of New Party back in 1993, 
and case of Noda, a Prime Minister of Democratic Party of Japan in 2012, both 
as non-LDP party, suggest that, in fact, bureaucrats had a greater chance to 
expand their influence on policy making when there are changes in the 
incumbent party. The success of raising consumption tax in 2012 is the 






5. Bureaucrats and LDP under DPJ 
 
Shigeaki Koga, a former bureaucrat, said, “DPJ thought that the LDP 
and the bureaucrats were the same because of all of those years (the DPJ was 
part of) the opposition. . . . They viewed the LDP as well as the bureaucrats as 
their enemies, and that is why when the DPJ took power, they (sidestepped) the 
bureaucrats” (Ito 2012). This section of thesis analyzes the relationship of MOF 
bureaucrats and LDP under DPJ rule. In turn, this study argues that in the end, 
LDP and bureaucrats did benefit from the same goal. 
 
Furthermore, Kato argued that under LDP system, the policy-making 
process were based on the interaction of bureaucrats and the same incumbent 
party and excluded opposition parties (Kato 1994, 233). Nevertheless, the case 
of the consumption tax hike of 2012 revealed a very different scenario. Having 
the bureaucrats’ support behind him, Noda’s main weapon to pass the bill was 
based on his cooperation with opponent opposition parties. Cheol Hee Park 
argued that rather than maintaining his own party solidarity, Noda placed more 
importance on making a grand coalition with the LDP and New Komei to raise 
the consumption tax. Which made the “Japanese electorate wonder whether 




This section argues that Noda’s strong desire to pass the consumption 
increase bill was a win-win game for both bureaucrats and the LDP whereas it 
was eventually a losing game for DPJ. From the beginning, it was the LDP that 
declared the plans for a VAT hike in its electoral manifesto in 2009 (Zakaowski 
2015). Furthermore, “most of the LDP politicians were aware of the necessity 
to increase the consumption tax and preferred to have this unpopular reform 
implemented before the expected return to power” (Yomirui Shinbun Sijibu 
2012). On February 25th 2012, Noda secretly met with the LDP leader, 
Tanigaki Sadakzu, trying to persuade Tanigaki for the cooperation. In turn, 
Tanigaki demanded the dissolution of the House of Representative as a pre-
requisite for the tax system (Zakaowski 2015, 180). Furthermore, “The LDP 
leaders repeatedly told DPJ executives that they would cooperate on the 
consumption tax increase bill if the DPJ kicked out Ozawa and his supporters” 
(Park 2015, 11). 
 
Asahi on April 9th 2012 published a news article titled, “Finance 
Ministry maneuvers behind the scenes of tax hike bill.” It reported that, 
Ministry officials were worried that Diet deliberations delayed, a senior Finance 
Ministry official request the LDP President Sadakazu Tanigaki to agree to enter 
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into discussion on the bill in the Lower House by April 26th (9
th
 April 2012). 
MOF bureaucrats actually went back and forth among DPJ and LDP leaders to 
reach necessary agreement (Ito 2013). Sumio Mabuchi, a DPJ lawmaker and 
former land minister, claimed that MOF are lobbying LDP lawmakers about the 
tax bill. He said, from an early stage, “I heard from an LDP lawmaker that 
Finance Ministry officials are making the rounds of LDP lawmakers to cancel 
out DPJ-proposed revisions,” and claims that, “a tide of bureaucratic control is 
emerging” (9
th
 April 2012). With all the efforts the bureaucrats and Noda has 
put in, the negotiators from the three parties achieved an agreement on 15 June 
2012 (Zakaowski 2015, 183). 
 
As result, LDP won the next election without having to worry about 
going through troubles implementing consumption tax increase. Moreover, the 
result of the consumption tax increase in 2012 was clearly a win-win game for 
bureaucrats as their long dream had come true. Takahashi maintains his 
argument that Japan’s Ministry of Finance is back as he says, “the MOF’s 
diminished role during the stagnation of the two decades that followed is 
coming to an end as bureaucrats take advantage of the inexperience of DPJ 
lawmakers to expand influence on policy making” (Reynolds and Hirokawa 
2012a). According to Izuru, who argues that the biggest result of the DPJ’s 
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“politician-led government” so far has been the virtual end of the practice of 
“bureaucrat bashing” (2011). Furthermore, The DPJ’s failure unquestionably 
exposed the fact that the bureaucracy has surprisingly remarkable role in 
Japanese politics, reminding reformers of the inherent difficulty of reducing its 
power (Izuru 2011). 
 
Figure 7. DPJ and LDP’s Support Rate in NHK Polls  
 
(Source: Nippon Hoso Kyokai) 
 
 Figure 7 represents the DPJ and LDP’s support rate conducted by 
Nippon Hoso Kyokai. Despite the high hopes for the DPJ administration in the 
beginning, the support rate of DPJ from over 40 percent of in September 2009 
fell under 15 percent by July 2012. The support rate of the LDP rose from just 
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below 20 percent up to just over 25 percents but exceeded the DPJ by the time 
of May 2nd. In the December 2012 general election, DPJ gained only 56 seats 
while LDP returns to power by gaining 294 seats. Park argues that Noda’s 
strong desire for a tax hike was the cause of division within the party - “Noda’s 
strong drive for a consumption tax increase eventually divided the DPJ” (Park 
2015). He further contends that “if we review all the political blunders and 
mistakes of the DPJ, especially by the Noda cabinet, the DPJ should be blamed 
for its own failure,” and “it is the DPJ government itself that helped the LDP to 
return to power” (Park 2015). Mishima also argues that “the consumption tax 
problem messed up the Noda’s Cabinet’s policy making most severely” 
(Mishima 2015, 442).  
   
Conclusion of Chapter 
 
When Hatoyama declared war on bureaucrats in 2009, “bureaucrats, for 
their part, [were] preparing various strategies of their own to meet the challenge 
from the new administration” (Asahi Shimbun 7
th
 October 2009). In the end, the 
MOF could achieve their long dream of raising the consumption tax whereas 
DPJ was clearly defeated in the following election. This section further 
enhanced an understanding of how Noda became more vulnerable to the MOF 
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persuasion even before taking the office as prime minister and had no choice 
but to rely on their expertise. Hatoyama’s failure and Kan’s lack of capability to 
deal with emergency incidents ultimately accused the concept of a politician-led 
government on major newspaper as not being only “immature” but also 
“dangerous”. 
 
 As noted back in the previous chapter, these excessive negative results, 
in fact, made prime minister Noda “end the risky gambit and return to many 
LDP like practices” (Zakaowski 2015). Based on the analysis, this chapter 
argued that the bureaucrats’ strategic recovery of their power initiated as soon 
as Hatoyama declared war on them and gradually but surely carried out the 
preparation for the consumption tax increase. This chapter argued that despite 
the promise that the DPJ made to curtail bureaucracy and devolve power to 
citizens when they took office in 2009, rather than curtailing bureaucratic 
influence, it has increased under DPJ’s rule, in fact, through Noda.  
 
The Asahi Shimbun on October 7th, 2009 introduced the strategy of 
Defense Ministry on DPJ, “the Defense Ministry's strategy is based on flexible 
response and is being dubbed the ‘1-8-1’ theory.” A high-ranking Defense 
Ministry official expands the meaning, explaining that the first 1 would be 
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carried out by changing the style of doing things, while the 8 involves 
maintaining the status quo,” and “the final 1 would allow the DPJ government 
to carry out what LDP government could not” (October 2009). Asahi Shimbun 
further analyzes what it means based on the example of Marine Corps Air 
Station Futenma, “the first 1 relates to the DPJ argument to move Marine Corps 
Air Station Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture. Then, the ministry would 
conduct a review of the proposal, but in the end to convince the government to 
give up on that possibility.” 
 
In fact, this study showed how “1-8-1 theory” can be also applied to the 
Ministry of Finance strategy of flexible response. First 1 –as of changing the 
style of doing things-- relates to the DPJ argument on eliminating 
administrative waste and corruption by introducing a politician-led government. 
The MOF would conduct a review of the proposal, but as of the final 1, in the 
end it would convince the government to give up on that possibility. 
Furthermore, the final 1 would allow the DPJ government to carry out what 
LDP government could not, which was the raising of the consumption tax. 
 
This chapter observes the various elements of DPJ that bolster the 
revival of bureaucratic strategic influence on policy-making that was even 
 
100 
stronger than what is was under LDP. In turn, a rebuttal to Kato’s argument that 
the strong bureaucratic power is maintained under an unchanging incumbent 
party system, this chapter argued that, based on the evidence of DPJ’s case, the 
bureaucracy has a higher chance to expand their influence when the incumbent 
politicians lack policy expertise and are inexperienced rather than with a 
disciplined party with a majority power for a long period. Furthermore, DPJ’s 
case clearly shows evidence against Kato’s assertion that “bureaucrats may not 
be able to implement as major a policy change as occurred under the LDP rule, 
















1. Limitation of Study 
 
Since the objective of the study was to find another possible alternative 
to explain one single case of Noda’s 2012 consumption tax increase, it heavily 
relied on news articles and statements from insiders. This study further relied 
on previous consumption tax hike cases in Japan referencing theoretical 
framework generated from Junko Kato in 1994. However, this consumption tax 
increase is fundamentally different from previous studies as it was under new 
ruling party. Thus the study made a comparison with the New Party under the 
Hosokawa case. It came to conclusion that bureaucrats rather increased their 
influence under inexperienced new ruling parties. However, this generalization 
has a drawback since it has only two cases to examine due to the LDP’s long 
success in maintain its power. Thus, this study further investigated DPJ’s 
various elements that bureaucrats could tackle in order to achieve their goal 
focusing consumption tax. This information was drawn from news articles, 
previous studies, interviews from associates. However, since this study was not 
based on the field research, there still are limitations in investigating in-depth 




2. Future Study Suggestion 
 
 As the study left further implications in the last part of chapter four, the 
relationship between the LDP and bureaucrats----not under LDP rule but under 
the DPJ----is still under investigation. In other words, the relationship between 
the bureaucrats and the opposition party (in 2012) leaves further implications. It 
is the fact that the LDP had a long history of keeping its position as an 
unchanging incumbent party. Thus questions raised are as follows: Who 
benefits from the DPJ’s success in pushing a consumption tax hike? Who 
benefits from the fall of DPJ? Even if they did have some degree of cooperation 
to push Noda and the DPJ to be a cannon fodder, what implication does that 
have on Japanese democracy? 
 
 2. Result/Discussion 
 
Noda’s decision to raise the consumption tax breached the DPJ’s own 
manifesto and eventually caused the Ozawa led-forty-nine members of his 
faction to leave the DPJ in protest. As a result, the DPJ lost its hard-won 
election and power. This study started from asking the why; that is, why would 
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Noda raise the consumption tax and risk his own political life? What was the 
underlying force that drove Noda to raise the tax and to act out against the usual 
political interests? In order to investigate these questions, this study drew upon 
massive amounts of news articles, interviews and statements from associates, 
and public opinion polls. In order to obtain insight on the influence of the 
bureaucrats on Noda’s case, chapter two has reviewed classic studies on the 
capabilities of bureaucrats in Japan, how it shifted over time and under different 
political parties. Regardless of mainstream traditional debates on the “dominant 
bureaucracy school” versus “dominant politician school”, this study focuses on 
the interaction of politicians and the bureaucracy on the policy-making process. 
In fact this interaction between the bureaucrats and the politicians has been the 
main factor that results in the weaker political authority over bureaucracy and 
source of constraint of administrative reform in Japan (Furukawa) as it was the 
case for DPJ as well.  
 
Chapter three is a primary important chapter since it investigated 
Noda’s personal background, the MOF’s strategic approach, the MOF using the 
media under Noda, Noda’s Cabinet members, and the personnel appointments 
from the MOF. The result of the investigation revealed that the underlying force 
that drove Noda to raise the consumption tax was the MOF under Eijiro Katsu 
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in the combination with the external situation such as the Triple Disaster which 
was used to convince the public for the necessity of the tax increase. Noda’s 
background has made him more prone to bureaucrats’ strategic persuasion and 
Katsu’s personnel appointments planted on Noda’s Cabinet were the 
fundamentally important factors on the 2012 consumption tax increase and to 
win over battle within the party itself on the issue. In short, the MOF’s power to 
convince both in (Cabinet and party itself) and out (public by using media, 
cooperation with opposition party) has been both fundamental factors that 
pushed the tax hike bill without strong resistance. This chapter argues beyond 
Kato’s theoretical framework that bureaucrats not only strategically target 
politicians but also MOF bureaucrats select and educate young politicians and 
bureaucrats and plant them into the cabinet. This ‘plantation’ played crucial role 
since it was also used to suppress the anti-tax group. 
 
However, this study came to comprehend that this strategic approach 
was in fact initiated even before Noda came as prime minister. Thus, to find the 
root, this study further explored Kan’s cabinet and how Kan’s anti-bureaucratic 
stance shifted as exposure to bureaucratic advertises and persuasion increases. 
Then, this study further realized that the strategic approach to Kan started even 
before Kan took power as prime minister.  In fact, it started right after when 
 
105 
Hatoyama declared anti-bureaucratic practices. Later on in September 2009, 
Kan, as a national policy minister, met Katsu due to the government’s inability 
to decide on the basic budget policy and issues of revenue shortage. This is 
crucial point since this meeting placed Fujii, who was instrumental in installing 
Noda as Vice Minister of Finance, and as later on Katsu played major role on 
pushing Noda’s consumption tax increase. This study discovered that MOF was 
already in preparation to raise the consumption tax regardless of DPJ’s election 
manifesto and even before DPJ came as the incumbent party, “first, it is basic 
that we will make various preparations in accordance with them” (Yasutake 
2012).  
 
Furthermore, the study argued that the DPJ’s inexperience and 
instability of party itself made it an easier game for the MOF to increase its 
impact on the policy-making process and revive their power. This study than 
doubted whether the DPJ had the ability to challenge the bureaucrats in the first 
place. It comes to conclusion that, despite its election manifesto, bureaucrats 
rather expanded their influence because the DPJ never had capacity to win over 
the bureaucrats and bureaucrats were aware of this from the beginning. 
Bureaucrats did not protest nor oppose the DPJ’s initial plans but rather showed 
a flexible response and strategically targeted politicians and strategically 
 
106 
installed their allies into the Cabinet. One critical point made in the study is that 
DPJ and Noda, in fact, served as a foothold for MOF’s long dream of raising 
the consumption tax.  
 
During the era of LDP’s rule, there was a tendency to pin the blame on 
the bureaucracy whenever results went bad. However, the biggest result of the 
DPJ’s “politician-led government” so far has been the virtual end of the practice 
of “bureaucrat bashing” (Izuru 2011). This time, the blame of negative results 
and discontent towards the consumption tax hike directed toward the DPJ’s 
incapacity.  
 
In the rebuttal to Kato’s argument, based on the fact that Finance 
Ministry mandarins’ long dream has come true under DPJ and Noda, this study 
contended that bureaucrats’ influence on the policymaking process does not 
rely on their expectation of politicians’ behavior and, in fact, bureaucrats 
experts are more demanded in a “setting” where there is confusion and 
instability in the system. In other word, as it was shown in DPJ’s case, this 
study argued that that the bureaucracy has a higher chance to expand their 
influence when the incumbent politicians lack policy expertise and are 
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inexperienced rather than under disciplined party with a majority power for a 
long period.  
 
 Examining the case based on the concrete economic rationale---as seen 
in the many studies— the argument would turn out very differently. From an 
economic perspective, some believe that Noda’s consumption tax increase was 
an unavoidable decision to make and Noda’s dedication can be seen as 
sacrificial for the sake of his nation. Moreover, if the purpose of this thesis was 
to examine the rise and fall of DPJ, many more variables could have been given 
such as lack of internal unity, ineffective leadership, diplomatic relations, poor 
election strategies and/or twisted diet. However, the objective of this thesis is 
not to argue the power of the bureaucracy and explain the rise and fall of DPJ. 
Instead, this study proposed that the indirect impact of the bureaucrats that had 
been1 thought of as the major reason of the DPJ’s break-up, the consumption 
tax. Furthermore, this study purely investigated the bureaucratic influence on 
Noda’s decision and its policy-making processes. The rise and fall of the DPJ 
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2012년 노다 요시히코 총리는 일본에서 15년 만에 2015년까지 소비
세 10%의 인상에 대한 의회의 승낙을 얻어냈다. 논란에도 불구하고, 
노다 총리는 정책의 성공에 자기 자신의 정치 인생을 걸겠다고 선언 
했다. 노다 총리의 그러한 결정은 정당 전체의 메니페스토를 위반하
는 것 이이었고, 결국 반대하던 오자와를 포함한 49명의 민주당위원
의 탈당이라는 치명적인 결말을 초래 하였다. 그 결과 민주당은 
2012년 12월 선거에서 비극적인 참패를 당하고 3년 3개월 이라는 
짧은 집권을 마무리 지었다. 그렇다면 당의 이러한 결과에도 불구하
고, 노다 총리는 왜 자신의 정치적 생명까지 내던지며 소비세를 인상 
하였는가?  이러한 정치적 이익에 어긋나는 노다의 결정 뒤에는 어떠
한 근본적인 힘이 있었는가? 
 
이 연구는 노다의 소비세 인상의 결정을 뒤에서 도모한 관료들의 영
향력, 합리성, 설득력 그리고 전략적 접근이 미친 영향을 조사한다. 
연구 시작에 앞서, 제 2장에서는 오랫동안 일본 정치에서 논점이 되
어온 정치인과 관료의 관계구조를 알기 위해 일본의 ‘관료 주도’ 는 
무엇이었는지, 자민당의 ‘행정조직 주도’는 어떠한 배경에서 생겨났는
지, 또 민주당의 ‘정치 주도’ 또는 ‘수상 주도’ 가 무엇이었는지에 관
해 탐구한다. 제 3장에서는, 본격적으로 2012년 소비세 인상에 있어 
재무상의 내부적인 위력을 분석하기 위해, 노다 내각의 정책 결정프
로세스와 내각 구성인원의 라인업을 검토한다. 또 외부적인 요인으로
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서 재무상이 2011년도에 일본을 강타한 동일본 대지진, 쓰나미, 후쿠
시마 원전 사고 일명 ‘삼중의 재해’를 어떤 방식으로 이용해 미디어를 
통해 소비세 인상에 대해 대중을 설득하였는지 분석한다.  
 
더 나아가 마지막 장에서는 어떻게 관료들이 민주당의 선거 선언문에
도 불구하고 노다와 민주당을 통해 정책 결정프로세스에서 더 많은 
영향력을 얻을 수 있었는지에 관해 조사한다. 따라서, 제 4장에서는 
관료들의 전략적 접근과 관료의 정책결정 프로세스 책략의 부활을 가
능케 해주었던 민주당의 다양한 요소를 분석한다. 연구 결과, 이 논문
은 재무상의 오랜 꿈이었던 2012년도 소비세 인상은 여당이 민주당
이었기 때문에 가능했다고 주장한다. 즉, 집권당의 변경, 민주당의 정
치적 전문성과 지식의 결여, 당내의 혼란과 민주당의 시스템 불안정, 
당의 재난 위기 대처의 실패가 노다 정권아래 재무상의 영향력을 부
활시켜 주었고, 소비세 인상 책략의 밑바탕이 되어 소비세 인상이라
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